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ABSTRACT 
 Rhetoric and public policy scholars have shown interest in uncertainty and polysemy in 
Congress, but they have traditionally treated legislation as a given. Members of Congress 
disagree about what policy should be, but they also disagree about what any given bill proposes 
to do. From a rhetorical perspective, I investigate the creation of uncertainty about legislation 
through the 2013 Senate debate on immigration. I argue that legislation is inherently ambiguous 
because legislative debate is consistently pushed behind the language of statutes. Rather than 
consider statutes unto themselves, members of Congress understand them in terms of the 
potential acts they sanction. Legislation thus becomes a framework for action, and legislators 
work to construct the probable acts that will result from its passage. By conceptualizing 
legislation as a framework for action, I shed new light on an unexplored source of disagreement 
in policy debate. 
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1 Introduction 
The rationality problem thus consists in this: how can the application of a contingently  
emergent law be carried out with both internal consistency and rational external  
justification, so as to guarantee simultaneously the certainty of law and its rightness? 
 
 —Jürgen Habermas, Between Facts and Norms, 19961 
 
Jürgen Habermas rightly puts communication, law, and deliberation all into conversation 
with one another, and by doing so, he provides a great model for the field of rhetoric. Studies of 
the rhetoric of law and the rhetoric of public policy have become de facto separated. Scholars of 
rhetoric and law simply do not study Congress, and scholars of rhetoric and public policy do not 
integrate legal insights into discussions on proposed and enacted legislation. As a result, we have 
created an a-legal understanding of policymaking that must be corrected if we are to fully 
appreciate deliberative encounters. Whether intentionally drawn or not, we should not respect 
any territorial boundaries between the rhetoric of law and rhetoric of public policy. Public policy 
and law are integrally connected and should be treated as such.  
One casualty of the current analytic separation of policy and law is an understanding of 
the polysemy of legislation.2 Rhetoricians tend to look at legislation as a political rather than 
legal act, and thus, do not conceptualize legislation as polysemous in policy disputes because 
other disputes take center stage. Habermas provides a good language through which we can 
discuss this problem. He sees a legitimation crisis for the law; a tension exists between facticity 
and validity, between the coercive force of the law and its validity amongst society’s various 
                                                 
 
1
 Jürgen Habermas, Between Facts and Norms: Contributions to a Discourse Theory of Law and 
Democracy, trans. William Rehg (Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press, 1996), 199.  
 
2
 I accept Leah Ceccarelli’s definition of polysemy as multiple but not indefinite meanings in a text. See 
Leah Ceccarelli, “Polysemy: Multiple Meanings in Rhetorical Criticism,” Quarterly Journal of Speech 84, no. 4 
(1998), 398. 
9 
 
lifeworlds.3 For Habermas, if morality is contingent, then the law requires some basis on which 
to legitimize itself. Although he acknowledges that the law is uncertain, in the face of validity, he 
allows it to function as a social fact.4 The law thus becomes the stable side of the equation—an 
existent thing waiting for its legitimizing rhetoric. Ronald Dworkin calls this the “plain fact” 
view of the law, the view that disagreements over law are actually disagreements over the 
morality or fidelity of law. Law itself, according to this view, is not actually uncertain.5 As I 
show in the next section, most of the rhetoric and public policy literature investigates the 
uncertainty of validity, the uncertainty in the premises for the law, and the issue becomes not 
how we interpret what statutes do but how we interpret the justification for statutes. Without 
denying the ambiguity of the legislative act, rhetoric and public policy scholarship has allowed it 
to function as a social fact in order to put other uncertainties center stage. In order to fully 
understand policy disagreements that so often trouble the American political system, we should 
understand proposed policies themselves as uncertain and rhetorically constructed. 
In response to this gap in the scholarship, I analyze how legislative ambiguity arises and 
problematizes policy debate. I argue in this thesis that legislation deflects clear understanding by 
directing attention outside of itself. When legislation is considered an “enactment” within a 
context, senators strategically construct the context to leverage understanding of what legislation 
does. Legislation, in this sense, must be understood by analogy to past legislation. Our 
understanding of legislation rests on the policy history constructed as its backdrop, history which 
                                                 
3
 Habermas, Between Facts and Norms, 8-9. 
 
4
 There can be no doubt that Habermas understands the uncertainty that exists in legal statutes. He spends 
an entire chapter covering legal schools of interpreting the law, but his main project of understanding the law’s 
legitimation largely leaves those uncertainties to one side. See Between Facts and Norms, 197-203. 
 
5
 Ronald Dworkin, Law’s Empire (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1986), 6-11. 
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always involves selection and reconstruction.6 When considered for its statutory language, 
legislation calls our attention not to one legislative act but to many potential acts contained 
within the framework it established by the law. We are called to understand not what legislation 
does but what different interpretive agents might do with it. We are either called to situate the 
legislation in an uncertain history or to look deeper into the framework created by the legislation 
for all potential acts it allows. Both the inside and outside of legislation are inherently 
polysemous. 
This chapter sets the groundwork for this argument. I first explain the trend in the rhetoric 
and public policy literature towards questioning previously accepted “givens,” a trend which sets 
the stage to question the given of legislation. Then, I show how the rhetoric and public policy 
literature has neglected legislation’s uncertainty by instead focusing on other uncertainties, 
essentially allowing legislation to function as a social fact. Next, I cover my methods for this 
project, starting with how I picked the text for analysis—the 2013 Senate immigration debate—
and ending with an explanation of Burkean pentadic analysis that I will be employing. Finally, I 
preview the rest of the chapters for the project. 
 
1.1 The Rhetorical Construction of Policy Givens 
When the president and members of the Congress of the United States “go public,” they make 
sense of policy issues facing the nation and construct meaning through their discourse.7 Not only 
is this point widely accepted in the rhetoric and public policy literature, but it has also drawn 
                                                 
6
 For a discussion of history as constructed, see Patrick H. Hutton, “Collective Memory and Collective 
Mentalities: The Halbwachs-Ariés Connection,” Historical Reflections 15, no. 2 (1988): 311-322. 
7
 Samuel Kernell, Going Public: New Strategies of Presidential Leadership (Washington, D.C.: CQ Press, 
1986), 1. 
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significant study. Scholars in this literature have mostly dedicated themselves to uncovering the 
observations implicit in constructions of a policy context, in other words, to understand the 
“politics of representation.”8 An understanding of policy context has normative force that calls 
for specific action.  
 Rhetorical critics have begun to question how the “givens” in policy debates constitute a 
policy context and implicate the policy decision. They demonstrate that the power of policy 
rhetoric is often not that of a direct argument. Rather, policy rhetoric alters the argumentative 
terrain by constructing a social reality that calls for the outcome members present. In Burkean 
terms, they build a scene implicit with a desirable or necessary act of Congress in response.9 I 
will consider three types of premises that have been questioned in the rhetoric and public policy 
literature. 
First, rhetorical critics have shown how policy problems are constructed to implicate the 
types of solutions that are needed. Robert Asen, Lisa Gring-Pemble, and David Zarefsky all 
demonstrate that the rhetorical construction of poverty helps to rationalize certain policy 
outcomes. 10 By depicting welfare recipients as amoral and feckless, for example, policymakers 
justify contracting with religious organizations to provide social services because they will 
supply recipients with a moral foundation.11 Alternatively, if policymakers depict the poor as 
good-natured, vulnerable, and struggling, it may justify an increase in welfare payments or even 
                                                 
8
 See Robert Asen, Visions of Poverty: Welfare Policy and Political Imagination (East Lansing, MI: 
Michigan State University Press, 2009), 12. 
 
 
9
 Kenneth Burke, A Grammar of Motives (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1945). 
 
 
10
 Asen, Visions; Lisa Gring-Pemble, “‘Are We Now to Govern by Anecdote?’: Rhetorical Constructions of 
Welfare Recipients in Congressional Hearings, Debates, and Legislation,” Quarterly Journal of Speech 87, no. 4 
(2001): 341-365; David Zarefsky, President Johnson’s War on Poverty: Rhetoric and History (University, AL: The 
University of Alabama Press, 1986). 
 
11
 Gring-Pemble, “Govern by Anecdote,” 355-356. 
 
12 
 
income redistribution.12 Rhetoricians have taken up the constructed nature of the problem in 
other instances as well. Brian Amsden shows that the youth suffrage debate shifted in its 
construction of the established problem, a shift from the individual’s capacity to make good 
decisions and toward young people as a political force that need to be represented.13 David 
Levasseur argues that the exigence of the 1995 budget battle between Clinton and the 
Republicans in Congress called for comparing the two budgets rather than comparing them to the 
status quo.14 The policy problem thus is framed as a choice between two seemingly different 
budget proposals, when in reality they were very similar when compared to current budget 
levels.15 Kirt Wilson reveals how members of Congress in the 1874 civil rights debate came to 
two separate conclusions because they had two different understandings of the current state of 
racial inequality, thus the prudent course of action was different for opponents and proponents of 
the civil rights legislation.16 It is clear from these studies that the construction of the policy 
problem will justify different solutions. 
Second, scholars have shown how public will or opinion, supposedly the legitimating 
force behind policy in a representative democracy, is uncertain in policy debates. Even the idea 
of the public has changed considerably over the centuries, which Habermas outlines in The 
Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere, so public opinion is even more difficult to 
                                                 
12
 Asen, Visions, 97-101. 
 
 
13
 Brian Amsden, “Democratic Prudence and the Youth Suffrage Debate,” Argumentation and Advocacy 48 
(2011): 22-38. 
 
 
14
 David G. Levasseur, “The Rhetorical Construction of Economic Policy: Political Judgment and the 1995 
Budget Debate,” Rhetoric & Public Affairs 3, no. 2 (2000): 183-209. 
 
15
 Ibid, 185. 
 
 
16
 Kirt H. Wilson, “The Contested Space of Prudence in the 1874-1875 Civil Rights Debate,” Quarterly 
Journal of Speech 84 (1998): 131-149. 
 
13 
 
identify.17 As Levasseur points out, public opinion does not simply amount to modern day 
Gallup polls.18 Publics and thus public opinion are not existent—they are made through 
discourse. G. Thomas Goodnight and Kathryn Olson argue that publics are created and 
mobilized through argument, and they mirror Michael Calvin McGee’s assertion that the public 
is a “fantasy” with a “strictly linguistic” existence.19 As a result, the supposed self-evidence of 
the public and its opinions creates the “myth” of public opinion.20 J. Michael Hogan has done a 
significant amount of work in this area to show both how public opinion is ambiguous and 
situationally deployed in policy disputes.21 Scholars have thus problematized the notion that 
public will is understandable and can be used as a premise for policy decisions. 
Third, the institution of Congress itself has come under scrutiny. The institution is neither 
natural nor neutral, and it privileges certain voices over others. The structure and rules for 
interaction in Congress have been studied because they provide rhetorical opportunities and 
difficulties within the institution. Chris Darr, for instance, questions whether Senate civility rules 
provide for civility and robust debate, which, upon the assumption of many deliberative theorists, 
provides for a better policy.22 As Tarla Rai Peterson argues, the procedures for debate help cloak 
                                                 
17
 Jürgen Habermas, The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere: An Inquiry into a Category of 
Bourgeois Society, trans. Thomas Burger (Cambridge, MA: The MIT University Press, 1991). 
 
 
18
 David G. Levasseur, “The Role of Public Opinion in Policy Argument: An Examination of Public 
Opinion Rhetoric in the Federal Budget Process,” Argumentation and Advocacy 41 (2005): 152. 
 
 
19
 G. Thomas Goodnight and Kathryn Olson, “Entanglements of Consumption, Cruelty, Privacy, and 
Fashion: The Social Controversy over Fur,” Quarterly Journal of Speech 80 (1994): 272; Michael Calvin McGee, 
“In Search of ‘The People’: A Rhetorical Alternative,” Quarterly Journal of Speech 61 (1975): 239-240. 
 
 
20
 Richard Vatz, “Public Opinion and Presidential Ethos,” Western Journal of Speech Communication 40, 
no. 3 (1976): 198-200. 
 
 
21
 J. Michael Hogan and Leroy Dorsey, “Public Opinion and the Nuclear Freeze: The Rhetoric of Popular 
Sovereignty in Foreign Policy Debate,” Western Journal of Speech Communication 55 (1991): 334. 
 
 
22
 Christopher Darr, “Adam Ferguson’s Civil Society and the Rhetorical Functions of (In)Civility in United 
States Senate Debate,” Communication Quarterly 59, no. 5 (2011): 604. 
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power structures operating within the institution of Congress.23 Scholars also point to the 
exclusionary tendencies of the institution. Daniel C. Brouwer shows how ACT UP activists 
participated in congressional hearings—an intrusion of a counterpublic into highly traditional 
public arena. The institution, in this case, becomes a site of potential co-optation of the 
movement by Congress, hence ACT UP’s ambivalence towards the hearings and fear of lending 
legitimacy to congressional policies on AIDS.24 In addition, Zornitsa Keremidchieva charts how 
the Congressional Women’s Caucus has struggled to represent women’s issues with a general 
dearth of institutional resources such as funding and space. The resulting institutional barriers 
made it more difficult to raise awareness about the difference between men and women’s needs, 
especially when most representatives in Congress are men.25 Far from a neutral, the structures of 
the congressional institution favor some policy outcomes over others. 
 While previous studies of public policy rhetoric take up the constructed nature of the 
policy situation (public opinion, the problem, the institution, etc.), they have not taken up the 
primary act of Congress—legislation—as a site of contested meaning. While members may even 
agree on what legislation says, we have yet to recognize that members of Congress come to 
different conclusions about what legislation does. Legislation lends itself to many interpretations, 
redefinitions, and reconstructions. Members of Congress battle to control the meaning of 
legislative acts in order to frame public understanding of policy debates. If we do not recognize 
this aspect of legislative rhetoric, then we miss one of the primary sites of contestation and 
                                                 
 
23
 Tarla Rai Peterson, “The Rhetorical Construction of Institutional Authority in a Senate Subcommittee 
Hearing on Wilderness Legislation,” Western Journal of Speech Communication 52 (1988): 273. 
 
 
24
 Daniel C. Brouwer, “ACT-ing UP in Congressional Hearings,” in Counterpublics and the State, eds. 
Robert Asen and Daniel C. Brouwer (Albany, NY: State University of New York Press, 2001), 88. 
 
25
 Zornitsa Keremidchieva, “Legislative Reform, the Congressional Caucus for Women’s Issues, and the 
Crisis of Women’s Political Representation,” Women & Language 35, no. 1 (2012): 32. 
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rhetorical construction in policy debates. Therefore, this study contributes to the rhetoric and 
public policy literature by investigating legislation as a site of contested rhetorical constructions.  
A few scholars have shown, to some extent, that legislation itself is rhetorically 
constructed, though none have explicitly made that claim or draw much attention to it. Gring-
Pemble explains that legislation reinforces dominant ideologies by “legislating” families, but the 
main thrust of her argument is that the depictions of welfare families throughout the debate 
resulted in legislation that affirmed the vision of an “ideal nuclear family.”26 Keremidchieva 
notes in passing that Senator Reed called the 19th Amendment a “certificate of democracy to 
other lands,” thus demonstrating that legislation can be used to construct American identity 
abroad.27 G. Thomas Goodnight goes farther than either Gring-Pemble or Keremidchieva, but he 
does not develop the point fully. He notes that Republicans focused on the 2002 Iraq War 
Resolution as a “vehicle for sending a message” and that political actors often disagree on “the 
nature and meaning of the proposed policy.”28 Interestingly, both Goodnight and Keremidchieva 
seem to have side-noted a phenomenon whereby political actors consider legislation as not just a 
material act but also as rhetorical, thereby further contesting the act’s meaning. In sum, the 
conversation about rhetoric in public policy is moving towards revealing the constructed-ness of 
different premises of policy-making. Particularly, Keremidchieva, Gring-Pemble, and Goodnight 
call attention to but do not take full account of the legislative act as constructed and contested. 
Rhetoricians should already to some extent understand that legislation is rhetorically 
constructed. Whether we consider appeals so superficial as naming legislation “The Patriot Act” 
                                                 
 
26
 Lisa Gring-Pemble, “Legislating a ‘Normal, Classic Family’: The Rhetorical Construction of Families in 
American Welfare Policy,” Political Communication 20 (2003): 475. 
 
 
27
 Zornitsa Keremidchieva, “The Congressional Debates on the 19th Amendment: Jurisdictional Rhetoric 
and the Assemblage of the US Body Politic,” Quarterly Journal of Speech 99, no. 1 (2013): 65. 
 
 
28
 Goodnight, “The Metapolitics of the 2002 Iraq Debate: Public Policy and the Network Imaginary,” 
Rhetoric & Public Affairs 13, no. 1 (2010): 78-79, 83. 
16 
 
or “The Affordable Care Act,” or whether we consider the merits of members looking like they 
are actively solving problems by putting forward bills, it seems obvious that legislation is a 
rhetorical construction. At the same time that we know this about legislation, policy critics 
frequently allow legislation to function as transparent background information, not as a rhetorical 
construction, and no real corrective has been offered. In Asen’s analysis of Lyndon Johnson and 
George W. Bush’s use of key education policy terms, for instance, he shows how the terms 
justified the policies which were ultimately implemented by refiguring the problems in our 
educational system and the relative capabilities of different educational institutions. His analysis, 
while commendable for showing how key terms can help constitute a policy problem to be 
solved, falls short once he gets to the legislative acts in question—namely, the Elementary and 
Secondary Education Act and No Child Left Behind. He takes it as a given that the ESEA 
provides a “basic floor” for poor communities and that NCLB required more strenuous testing 
for education.29  Additionally, Asen dedicates his entire book on welfare policy debates to 
understanding how images of the poor justified repealing parts of the Aid to Families with 
Dependent Children (AFDC). The repeal of AFDC legislation becomes a starting point, a social 
fact that calls for explanation and is legitimized by a shift in collective imagining about the 
poor.30  
I am not saying that the legislative acts did not do what Asen claims they did, but too 
frequently policy critics leave the legislative act alone without taking up its polysemous nature. 
Consider what Gring-Pemble said about the purpose of her article on the rhetorical construction 
of welfare recipients: “Ultimately, I show in this essay how depictions of welfare recipients and 
                                                 
 
29
 Asen, “Lyndon Baines Johnson,” 310. 
 
30
 Asen, Visions, 9. 
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their families form the basis of the enacted welfare legislation.”31 The main focus for Gring-
Pemble, as for Asen, is on the construction of the problem and how the problem implicates a 
solution. David Zarefsky argues quite clearly in his book on Johnson’s “War on Poverty” that the 
situation is rhetorically constructed to demand a specific policy response:  
Since the meaning of a situation is not intrinsically given, it must be chosen. By selecting 
which symbols indicate the situation, people define what it means. . . .This understanding 
will determine the appropriate response to the situation. If the phenomenon of a person 
lacking work is symbolized as indolence, sloth, or sinfulness, then stern admonition 
might be called for but public employment programs would seem extremely 
inappropriate. Conversely, if the same phenomenon is seen as a specific manifestation of 
a maladjusted economy, then moralizing or temporizing would seem ineffective if not 
hypocritical; the situation clearly calls for public action.32  
 
Zarefsky separates out the public action from the rhetorically constructed situation. In line with a 
deliberative tradition, public policy becomes a response to rhetoric. The question thus is not what 
the policy is but whether or not it is an appropriate response to the situation.  Levasseur, who 
teases out so many different ways that public opinion gets interpreted and contested, does not 
stop to consider how the federal budget itself is polysemous.33 Likewise, Michael Steudeman 
shows how the education policies of Lyndon Johnson are undergirded by a “heroic teacher” 
myth.34 I doubt that if any of these scholars were questioned that they would deny that legislation 
is rhetorically defined, but they do seem to allow legislation to sit somehow separately from the 
rhetorical work being done, to function, as I noted in the introduction, as a social fact. 
We need to stop talking about legislative acts as mere byproducts of prior rhetoric and 
instead consider them for the rhetorical constructions they are. This means opening up the other 
                                                 
 
31
 Gring-Pemble, “Govern by Anecdote,” 343. 
 
32
 Zarefsky, War on Poverty, 3. 
 
 
33
 Levasseur, “The Role of Public Opinion in Policy Argument.” 
 
 
34
 Michael Steudman, “’The Guardian Genius of Democracy’: The Myth of the Heroic Teacher in Lyndon 
B. Johnson’s Education Policy Rhetoric,” Rhetoric & Public Affairs 17, no. 3 (2014): 477-510. 
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side of the equation by looking at facticity rather than validity. The deep concern that policy 
critics have for polysemy should extend to the hotly contested meanings of the policy actions 
themselves. These studies seem to imply that policy actors agree on what legislation does, and as 
I will show, legislation is actually a key site of contestation. 
This review leads me to two conclusions. First, the rhetoric and public policy literature 
will continue to investigate aspects of policy debates to reveal the partiality of previously 
accepted givens. Second, the literature has not yet seriously considered the given of legislative 
acts. Thus, I seek to answer two research questions with my study:   
(1) How do policymakers reconstruct the legislative act? 
(2) What implications do any reconstructions of the legislative act have for our political 
discourse? 
The answers to both questions will inform future studies of public policy and congressional 
discourse. This study will provide a critical corrective to current conceptions of the legislative 
act, and it will allow rhetorical critics to appreciate the fullness of polysemy in policy debates. 
 Now that I have addressed the impetus for my study, I cover my approach to answering 
my research questions. There are three key aspects I explain about my approach: the type of texts 
I chose to analyze, the case study, and the method of analysis. To begin, I explain how I decided 
the types of policy texts to analyze. 
 
1.2 Finding the Public Policy Text 
The current literature offers little guidance to determine what type of texts to analyze in order to 
get at public policy rhetoric. Previous studies of public policy rhetoric have drawn upon 
hearings, popular discourse, memoirs, media appearances, and presidential speeches without any 
explicit reasoning why these fragments are relevant. Asen, for example, says that in order to fully 
19 
 
appreciate the policy rhetoric of FDR on social security, he would “have to place FDR’s address 
in dialogue with congressional committee hearings, House and Senate floor debates, government 
agency reports, news media coverage, public advocacy campaigns, and more.”35 There seems to 
be little explicit reasoning for why critics focus on one type of text over another. This 
methodological problem unfortunately starts with the vagueness of the term “public policy 
rhetoric.” Most scholars do not even offer a definition before they launch into their analyses, and 
as a result, any text even remotely touching on a political controversy may seem relevant to this 
study. Therefore, before looking at how to select policy texts to analyze, it is necessary to step 
back and take account of how I am defining public policy rhetoric. 
 Goodnight defines public policy argument as “a productive, situated communication 
process where advocates engage in justifying and legitimating public interests.”36 Vanessa 
Beasley tries to distinguish presidential rhetoric which is relevant to public policy rhetoric, and 
in doing so, she says that public policy rhetoric responds to some public need or the ongoing 
debate surrounding a public need.37 Zarefsky says the unit of analysis delineates public policy 
rhetoric from presidential rhetoric, that unit being “the controversy rather than the rhetor or the 
text.”38 Asen circles around the issue in his works on education, welfare, and social security 
debates, but he does not explicitly address it. Generally, he construes policy argument as any 
discourse from political actors brought publicly to bear on the laws that Congress passes. These 
                                                 
 
35
 Asen, “Reflections on the Role of Rhetoric in Public Policy,” Rhetoric & Public Affairs 13, no. 1 (2010): 
139. 
 
 
36
 Goodnight, “Metapolitics,” 66. 
 
 
37
 Vanessa Beasley, “The Rhetorical Presidency Meets the Unitary Executive: Implications for Presidential 
Rhetoric on Public Policy,” Rhetoric & Public Affairs 13, no. 1 (2010), 10. 
 
 
38
 David Zarefsky, “History of Public Discourse Studies,” in The SAGE Handbook of Rhetorical Studies, 
eds. Andrea A. Lunsford, Rosa A. Eberly, and Kirt H. Wilson (Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage, 2009): 445. 
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definitions are broad but somewhat helpful. We know that policy rhetoric is a pragmatic debate 
over public interests. 
Insofar as policy rhetoric is pragmatic, it is a means to very specific end: legislation. 
Rarely do scholars who “public policy rhetoric” investigate the policies exclusive to the 
executive branch.39 Beasley, who is studying the president’s role in policy-making, even says 
“[the rhetorical presidency] literature suggests that rhetorical presidents must garner popular 
support for their public policies and/or policy agendas as a prerequisite for successful 
implementation via congressional approval.”40 If the focus is on congressional implementation of 
policy, then the focus is on legislation.  
Given the aforementioned definitions and given that I am trying to understand how 
legislation is contested, I do my analysis of public policy rhetoric with the legislative debates 
which immediately surround the ultimate policy decision. For my purposes, it makes sense to 
analyze floor debates for two reasons. First, floor debates are highly intertextual—members of 
Congress typically create a patchwork of political voices within the floor debate by including 
letters from interest groups, recounting of news reports, popular culture, stories from 
constituents, and references to presidential speeches. It is for this reason that so many scholars 
turn to floor proceedings to study historical controversies,41 and it is why Brian Amsden refers to 
the Congressional Record as “the most sustained historical archive.”42 Second, floor debates 
                                                 
39
 A notable exception is Denise Bostdorff discussing Nixon’s policies on China. See Denise Bostdorff, 
“The Evolution of a Diplomatic Surprise: Richard M. Nixon’s Rhetoric on China, 1952–July 15, 1971,” Rhetoric & 
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feature legal arguments over statutory construction in ways that seldom reach the media, 
memoirs, presidential speeches, and so on. Floor debates thus provide insight into the legal side 
of congressional rhetoric.  
 
1.3 Case Study: The 2013 Senate Immigration Debate 
For my case study, I analyze the debates over bill S. 744, the Border Security, Economic 
Opportunity, and Immigration Modernization Act. In 2013, the Senate passed a comprehensive 
immigration reform bill to increase border security and to provide a pathway to citizenship for 
illegal immigrants in the country. Despite passing the Senate 68 to 32, the bill has been stalled 
from 2013 to 2015 because Speaker of the House John Boehner will not bring it to the floor in 
the House of Representatives. With President Obama’s executive order on immigration to defer 
deportation of five million illegal immigrants, the issue has only become more polarizing. 
 Immigration provides an ideal case to study polysemy in legislation. Although the issue is 
politically contentious, advocates of reform on both sides of the aisle claim to have very similar 
goals. Widespread agreement exists that the immigration system is “broken,” and Republicans 
and Democrats generally agree that a solution needs to involve both added security and a tough 
pathway to legalization for illegal immigrants who are already in the country. No one calls for 
mass deportation. Both parties even agree on the metrics for a secure border—100 percent 
situational awareness and 90 percent apprehension rate--and both agree that border security 
should come prior to permanent legalization. Senator Mike Lee (R-UT) claims it does nothing to 
secure the border by building fencing or increasing border patrol agents, that it does not live up 
to the expectations.43 Similar claims come from all opponents, such as Senator Tom Coburn (R-
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OK) who asserts the bill has no “teeth” to secure the border, Senator Ted Cruz (R-TX) who says 
the border security provisions will never be implemented, and Senator Chuck Grassley (R-IA) 
who says border security provisions are false promises.44 Meanwhile, Senator Chuck Schumer 
(D-NY) calls the bill “tough as nails” on border security, and other key proponents such as 
Senator Harry Reid (D-NV), Senator Patrick Leahy (D-VT), and Senator John McCain (R-AZ) 
tout the increased border security that the bill offers.45 
 The question boiling underneath the immigration debate is not what actions should be 
taken but whether immigration legislation takes those actions. As Grassley keenly observes, “the 
rhetoric was spot on, but the details were dubious.”46 As a result, both sides of the immigration 
debate have located uncertainty in the 2013 legislation, making it an ideal case study.  
 
1.4 A Pentadic Approach to the Texts 
For this study, I employ Kenneth Burke’s pentad to analyze the Senate immigration debate. 
Burke’s pentad accounts for fundamental forms of human thought about action. Any complete 
statement of action accounts for a person (agent) doing something (act) within a given 
background (scene) by some means (agency) for a reason (purpose). Whenever we answer 
questions of motive, whenever we explain “what people are doing and why they are doing it,” 
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Burke says we must necessarily draw on the resources of these five pentadic terms. Even when 
the terms are not present by name, they are present in function.47  
 Burke’s pentad is useful because it highlights how rhetors leverage motivational 
assumptions in one term to change an audience’s understanding of the rest of the terms of action. 
He explains that one term is often “featured” in that all the other terms are derived from its 
substance.48 Rhetors develop pentadic terms in logical coordination with one another. In 
congruence with Burke’s theory of form, we understand that the featuring of the agent, for 
instance, results in the “agentification” of the scene, act, agency, and purpose because we desire 
logical consistency between terms.49 The term “teacher” implies certain types of acts 
(instructing, grading), scenes (classroom, office, library), purposes (education), and agencies 
(textbook, lecturing). Our assumptions about what goes with what are leveraged to a rhetor’s 
advantage. 
 The pentad is particularly appropriate for analyzing legal discourse because discussions 
of the law must consider several acts in conjunction with one another. As Clarke Rountree 
argues, interpreters of the law must make sense of the past, present, and future, and that 
interpretative work involves accounting for action.50 In order to make sense of the present 
legislation, senators must reconstruct past acts in contextualizing the legislation and analyze 
potential future acts in the construction of statutes. Past policy acts are not isolated from potential 
future acts—they are brought to bear on one another. The pentad offers a language to discuss the 
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connection between acts.51 One pentadic set, one particular configuration of the scene, act, agent, 
agency, and purpose, necessarily implicates another. If an agent is constructed with regards to a 
scene, then that agent has been “grammatically limited” for other pentadic sets. Our 
understanding of that agent is not isolated to one particular configuration of the pentad, thus acts 
can be considered in conjunction with one another.  
Before I proceed further, I should address two possible objections to my use of the 
pentad. First, I do not formally employ ratios in my analysis although ratios are frequently used 
as an analytic tool when doing pentadic criticism. Second, I use the pentad to analyze the rhetoric 
of multiple senators. More traditional critics may see this as unwieldy if they believe pentadic 
analysis implies one rhetor with one audience and one coherent persuasive strategy. I will 
address each objection in turn. 
Many pentadic critics will use what Burke calls “ratios” to formally analyze the 
relationship between two terms in a pentadic set, what he refers to as “a formula indicating a 
transition from one term to another.”52 For example, a scene-agent ratio would document the 
transition of features of the scene onto the agent. I will not be explicitly using ratios in my 
analysis. A ratio is a reduction of scope from looking at the entire pentadic set to looking at only 
two terms, so they do not tell us anything new about the relationships between terms that we 
cannot learn from the pentadic set as a whole. Instead, they are an invitation to look more closely 
at two terms in isolation. When Burke originally wrote the Grammar of Motives, he saw ten 
possible permutations of ratios. However, once we get into the multiple pentadic sets in policy 
                                                 
 
51
 I am indebted to my father for his work on the “collision” of acts in pentadic analysis. He presented on 
this at a past Kenneth Burke conference but never published this research. 
 
52
 Burke, Grammar, 262. 
25 
 
discourse, the permutations increase exponentially. Drawing out, for instance, a scene-act-agency 
relationship will only overcomplicate and distract from more important aspects of my analysis. 
Rhetorical critics have found the pentad amenable not just to one rhetor’s strategy but to 
situations involving multiple rhetors. The pentad is particularly amenable to the study of 
constitutive rhetoric because it does not rely on identifying a group’s common rhetorical 
strategy, only on identifying a common epistemology. For instance, in their analysis of a hunting 
controversy, Mari Boor Tonn, Valerie A. Endress, and John N. Diamond use the pentad to reveal 
prevalent motivational assumptions of the Maine community.53 As Burke claims, everyone 
draws on the resources of the pentad, so the functions of the terms are going to be present 
whether a coherent rhetorical strategy exists or not.54  
 
1.5 Chapter Preview 
In chapter two, I briefly outline the history of United States immigration policy with a particular 
focus on the modern immigration debate. This history is important because past acts play such a 
vital role in interpreting the statutes of the 2013 immigration bill. Senators leverage past acts to 
implicate future acts. I draw special attention to attempts over the last thirty years to control 
illegal immigration and the impetus for Congress to consider these attempts as policy failures, 
signs of our broken immigration system. 
 Chapter three deals with policy history as constructed by senators on both sides of the 
immigration debate. Every piece of legislation occurs within a policy context, and I analyze how 
senators reconstruct the policy history of the last thirty years in order to attribute blame for the 
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current broken system. I use Burke’s theory of the “constitution-behind-the-constitution” to 
guide my search for the legislation-behind-the-legislation, the contextualizing work that reframes 
the 2013 legislation. Opponents of the 2013 bill allocate blame in scenic terms to construct a 
powerless legislature in the face of a line of broken promises, while proponents make the 
Congress into an active agent that has consistently increased security at the border. The two 
different attributions of action and motion have ramifications for interpreting potential future 
acts. Specifically, the construction of history allows opponents and proponents to place blame on 
different subversive agents that should not be empowered by the statutory construction of the 
2013 bill. 
 In chapter four, I turn to the statutory construction of the 2013 legislation. Statutes always 
permit leeway in interpretation because they are not acts as much as they comprise a framework 
for future acts. Congress has to speculate as to the probable future acts they will be taken under 
the allowance of statutes. Senators’ allocation of blame for the broken immigration system in 
chapter three leads them to interpret different subversive potentialities within statutes. 
Proponents fear that giving more interpretive power to Congress will mean giving the subversive 
agent from past policy (Congress) the capacity to undermine the legalization process of the 
eleven million illegal immigrants in the United States. They attempt to mitigate those potential 
subversive acts by allocating interpretive authority of statutes away from Congress. Meanwhile, 
opponents insert the executive branch as the subversive agent to accompany the past broken 
promises. They fear that giving interpretive power to the executive branch will allow the 
legalization to proceed without actually securing the border. Both sides use the construction of 
potential subversive acts to argue for giving statutory interpretation power to different parties.  
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 In the final chapter, I draw out three important implications for the incorporation of legal 
insights into legislation’s polysemy. Because the law undergirds each branch of government, I 
argue that we need more studies of the law permeating through each branch, thus putting 
Congress, the president, and the Supreme Court in conversation with one another. Second, I 
argue we should, given this legal framework, understand the Congress as a technical legal sphere 
of deliberation. This perspective raises troubling questions about the public’s ability to hold 
legislators accountable for their policy actions, particularly when they disagree over what 
statutes do and do not permit. Finally, I call for rhetoricians to look at the opportunities for 
rhetors to manufacture different understandings of legislation by leveraging public expectations 
of democratic debate, expectations that are integral even to our own scholarship on public 
deliberation. 
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2 A Brief History of American Immigration Legislation 
Not like the brazen giant of Greek fame, 
With conquering limbs astride from land to land; 
Here at our sea-washed, sunset gates shall stand 
A mighty woman with a torch, whose flame 
Is the imprisoned lightning, and her name 
Mother of Exiles. From her beacon-hand 
Glows world-wide welcome; her mild eyes command 
The air-bridged harbor that twin cities frame. 
 
“Keep, ancient lands, your storied pomp!” cries she 
With silent lips. “Give me your tired, your poor, 
Your huddled masses yearning to breathe free, 
The wretched refuse of your teeming shore. 
Send these, the homeless, tempest-tost to me, 
I lift my lamp beside the golden door!” 
 
—Emma Lazarus, “The New Colossus,” 1883 
 
 
 The United States is a nation of immigrants, yes, but one with a troubled history of strife 
and exclusion.55 Irony emerged in full form when Emma Lazarus’s “The New Colossus” was 
first venerated at the foot of the Statue of Liberty in 1903. Its placement came a mere year after 
the renewal of the Chinese Exclusion Acts, one of the most racist and prohibitive immigration 
policies in American history. The plaque now stands as a monument to America’s cognitive 
dissonance, a thin veil concealing an inconvenient history with golden-eyed sentiment.  
United States’ immigration policy historically follows patterns. Restrictive immigration 
policies surface when a powerful public fears losing its influence to the foreign “other.” Whether 
they blame the Chinese on the west coast during the 1880s or Latinos today, some Americans 
tend to fear the economic influence of cheap foreign workers depressing wages for labor across 
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the board.56 This fear extends to those with cultural and political power, particularly with the 
potential influence of the French, Jews, Germans, Japanese, Irish, and Mexicans immigrating to 
the United States.57 On the other hand, when the American economy is strong or when labor is in 
high demand, the U.S. opens its borders and pushes for more immigration in the hope that cheap 
labor will bolster the economy, whether that means using immigrants to settle the western 
frontier or to make up for labor shortages during wartime. The give and take, the opening and 
closing of American borders, demonstrates that immigration policy has much to do with the 
struggle for economic and political advantage, and it also demonstrates that during times of 
trouble, the American people find immigrants to be convenient scapegoats. Immigration policy is 
neither simple nor cyclical, but common patterns do emerge throughout the nation’s history. 
I recognize the difficulty and irony in writing a legislative history of immigration reform 
in a project aimed at elucidating the uncertainty in legislative provisions. That is, how can I 
explain what past legislation did while also emphasizing the ambiguity of legislation in general? 
To be clear, I maintain that legislation makes demonstrable changes to our legal system beyond 
the ambiguities produced in policy discourse. As Robert Asen argues, policy involves the 
mediation of rhetorical and material forces. 58 While policy is rhetorical because it necessarily 
involves the written language of the law and the interpretation of meaning therein, it is also 
necessarily material because it produces material results. Receiving or not receiving a Social 
Security check is a tangible result, as is putting more agents on the border between the United 
States and Mexico. Thus, legislative uncertainty should partially be stabilized by identifiable 
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material actions. In addition to the demonstrable material effects of laws, the passage of time 
usually irons out any major dissensus among historians and policy analysts on the meaning of 
most past legal provisions regarding immigration. Where uncertainty still persists over more 
recent legislation, I acknowledge that controversy remembering that, many of the provisions that 
are hazy in previous laws become renewed points of controversy in the 2013 immigration debate. 
I have divided up the history of immigration policy into three main sections. First, I 
review the early immigration policies of the United States. The government between 1787 and 
1921 mostly left immigration unrestricted, although it made serious forays into exclusionary 
policies with regards to the French and the Chinese. Next, I explain the turn away from mostly 
free immigration to quotas and other types of systems of preferences that applied to all 
immigrants starting in 1921. Finally, I show how the modern immigration debate shifted from a 
focus on legal immigration to one on illegal immigration. I go into more detail in the third 
section because the 2013 immigration debate closely ties into the debates that began in 1986. 
Illegal immigration rapidly increased starting in the 1960s and turned the nation’s attention to 
border security. The nation’s attention remains on border security to this day.   
 
2.1 Mostly Unrestricted Immigration and First Precedents for Exclusion: 1787-1921 
For the first hundred years of the new republic, the United States did little to limit immigration 
into the country and even aggressively encouraged it. Thomas Jefferson claimed that the country 
wanted to “produce rapid population by as great importations of foreigners as possible.”59 
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Americans mainly saw immigration as a means to improve industry and populate the West.60 The 
U.S. had available, temperate land that it was eager to market to northern Europeans, especially 
to help pay the country’s debts. In simple economic terms, open immigration policies increased 
demand for U.S. land.61 
 Of course, the land of the western frontier was already occupied by American Indians. 
Despite denials from U.S. government officials, the country seemed intent on conquering the 
west and deposing native tribes. Jefferson’s vision of an agrarian society depended on an 
abundance of land available to farmers, and settlers drove westward largely in hopes that they 
would find material success in an “errand into the wilderness.”62 Andrew Jackson believed that 
westward settlement marked the inevitable march of civilization.63 The policy of economic 
expansion and high immigration conflicted with national security goals. The more immigrants 
pushed the frontier west, the more antagonistic the country’s relationship with native 
communities became. Indeed, Indian affairs were placed under the newly created War 
Department in 1789. The early 1800s brought more warfare between the government and 
indigenous nations until finally Jackson began the process of forcibly relocating tribes to 
reservations in 1830 with the Indian Removal Act.64 That process became complete with the 
massacre at Wounded Knee in 1890. 
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Although national security concerns over native sovereignty did not impede unrestricted 
immigration, security concerns did lead to more restrictive immigration policies during the 
French Revolution. The mob violence in France led many refugees to flee to the New World, and 
the U.S. government felt leery about the refugees’ potential political influence.65 More 
specifically, the Federalists in power thought the immigrants would bolster the pro-French 
Republican Party, who they believed in turn would hand the nation over to France.66 Thus, 
Federalists saw immigration-control as both a matter of political power and national security. In 
response to the influx of foreign “radicals,” the Federalist Congress passed a group of 
controversial laws in 1798 called the Alien and Sedition Acts. These laws did not restrict 
immigrants’ ability to come to the United States but instead made it more difficult for 
immigrants to gain the political power afforded citizens.67 Collectively, the Alien and Sedition 
Acts increased the residency requirements for citizenship from five to fourteen years, gave the 
Adams administration the power to remove foreigners in times of war, and made it illegal to 
harbor foreigners without express permission from the government. After Thomas Jefferson 
became president, he allowed the acts to expire, but the short-lived laws set the precedent for 
restricting immigrants based on national security fears.68 
Other than the Alien and Sedition Acts, the U.S. did not make any major changes to 
immigration law for another century and allowed immigrants to enter the country in large 
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numbers. Chinese workers especially started pouring into the west coast in the 1840s, and they 
were welcomed because they provided a cheap labor source.69 Economic opportunity for the 
country and for working class Americans kept the nation’s borders open. The American Civil 
War especially created a shortage of working men, and industry and government began pushing 
immigrant labor to help finish construction on railroads.70 However, from the 1850s to the 1880s, 
anti-Chinese sentiment on the west coast developed. American workers mistakenly assumed that 
the Chinese were “coolies,” cheap servitude laborers, and that their presence hurt the standing of 
free labor.71 When the economic security of working Americans is threatened, American workers 
tend to blame immigration. The market downturns in the 1870s turned public sentiment and the 
government towards restrictive policies.72 In 1882, Congress passed the Chinese Exclusion Act 
to prevent Chinese workers from immigrating for ten years.73 Measures in 1892, 1902, and 1904 
reinforced the anti-Chinese provisions and in some cases made them more draconian by placing 
additional barriers to Chinese naturalization in the United States.74 Not only were these the first 
laws to restrict immigration to the United States based on race and nationality, but they also lent 
legitimacy to future exclusionary immigration policies to come in the 20th century. The federal 
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government had institutionalized racism and exclusion, setting the precedent for future quotas 
and restrictive immigration policies.75 
At the end of the 19th century, immigration restrictionists attempted to get more laws 
passed to weed out “undesirable” immigrant populations. Specifically, the restrictionist coalition 
attempted to impose mandatory literacy tests to exclude immigrants coming from Southern and 
Eastern Europe. The literacy laws failed to pass through Congress because they were opposed by 
business leaders and immigrant groups and also largely because economic prosperity from the 
end of the 19th century until World War I subdued much of the nativist sentiment and sense of 
impending disaster.76 For the moment, the country did not require an immigrant scapegoat. More 
crises, however, always lurk around the corner. 
 
2.2 America Restricts Legal Immigration: 1921-1986 
America’s entry into World War I spurred on existing nativist sentiment, especially against 
German-Americans who were erroneously deemed spies or traitors despite their support for the 
war effort. For a while, the war drew attention away from other immigrants from Southern and 
Eastern Europe whose home countries were resisting the Germans. Unfortunately, the end of the 
war did not do much to dampen American xenophobia. The Red Scare, labor strikes, and the 
economic depression from 1920 to 1921 all created social unrest, and such unrest historically 
breeds restrictive immigration policies.77 On cue, Congress debated new immigration restrictions 
from 1920 to 1921. With the 1921 Quota Act and the 1924 Johnson-Reed Act, Congress sought 
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to establish strict limits on how many immigrants could come to the country based on current 
immigrant residence in the U.S. The Quota Act only allowed immigration each year up to three 
percent of the current foreign-born population of the country in question, and the Johnson-Reed 
Act took the number down to two percent.78 These laws cut immigration levels down to fractions 
of what they had been in previous years.79 Because they were based on populations already 
residing in the U.S., immigration quotas heavily favored Northwestern Europe to the detriment 
of immigrants from Asia and Eastern Europe.80  
The U.S. Border Patrol was also created by the 1924 Act to guard the southern and 
northern borders of the country. Compared to today, the original 1930 Border Patrol was 
miniscule—875 men on horseback covering roughly 2,000 miles. Because the quotas only 
applied to immigrants from the eastern hemisphere, patrol officers looked for Europeans and 
Asians trying to cross the border. They almost never detained Mexican crossers, and when they 
did, they simply took them to an entry checkpoint so they could pay fees and enter the U.S. 
legally.81 
 Given that economic troubles normally lead to more restrictive immigration laws, it is 
somewhat surprising that the Great Depression did not lead to any major immigration bills from 
Congress. There were certainly calls for more restriction, even for a suspension of immigration 
completely until the Depression lifted. For three reasons, no major restrictive bill passed in the 
Depression Congress. First, the Republicans were the main restrictionists, and Democrats took 
back the House of Representatives in 1930 and won both chambers and the presidency in 1932. 
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A Republican government, such as that in the 1920s under Calvin Coolidge, probably would 
have passed strict legislation.82 Second, both Herbert Hoover and Franklin Roosevelt took 
administrative action to limit immigration. Specifically, they enforced a provision in the law that 
denied visas to people likely to become dependent on the government, so both administrations 
only allowed in the most prosperous immigrants. Finally, Europeans were not coming to 
America in large numbers during the Depression. The United States was not so appealing with an 
economy in tatters, and many immigration quotas were not even being filled.83 
 The Depression and war era from in the 1930s and 1940s created a sense of crisis that did 
not bode well for either Jewish or Japanese communities. Despite little immigration during the 
Depression, Jewish refugees fleeing Nazi Germany were anxious for an American asylum from 
persecution in Europe. Unfortunately, the American government did almost nothing to help 
Jewish refugees get into the country at the time, partly because of the prevalent anti-Semitism 
among Americans and partly because they would become an economic burden for the 
government.84 Some like Father Charles Coughlin even claimed that Jews orchestrated the 
Depression, and many American Jews, fearing immigration would result in increased anti-
Semitism, did not advocate for increased quotas. Although Roosevelt took some administrative 
measures to increase the amount of Jewish immigrants under the 1924 quota law, overall very 
little red tape was removed to help ease immigration restrictions for Jewish refugees. There was 
simply no political will to do so, even given a Democratic Congress.85 
                                                 
82
 Ibid, 268. 
 
83
 Jones, 240. 
 
84
 Davd M. Kennedy, Freedom from Fear: The American People in Depression and War, 1929-1945 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999), 413. 
 
85
 Zolberg, 275-277. 
37 
 
After Pearl Harbor, American antipathy and hostility also turned to Japanese 
communities. The government, authorized by President Roosevelt, argued that the presence of 
Japanese-Americans on the west coast, 70,000 of whom were born in the U.S., represented a 
danger to the public. The war-time government forcibly moved 110,000 Japanese-Americans 
from their homes in the west into internment camps for the duration of the war. National security 
again became the justification for oppressing an entire community of people. Contemptuous 
feelings towards those of Japanese heritage did not spring up out of nowhere on December 7, 
1941. The Japanese were stereotyped before the war as subversive and sneaky, a rogue “other.”86 
Much like during the French Revolution and during World War I, the public believed that 
ideology, radicalism, and loyalty had been imported from overseas, and Pearl Harbor ignited 
those basic American fears to the detriment of an entire community of citizens.87 
During the war, the United States faced labor shortages again, and the government 
created the Bracero Program in 1942 to fill the worker gap. The program was the result of the 
Bracero Treaty with Mexico and amounted to one of the most pro-immigrant labor agreements in 
U.S. history. Partially, American desire for a new workforce came from employers’ prejudice 
against hiring African-Americans or women.88 The program enabled temporary guest workers to 
come the U.S. for nine months out of the year, and the U.S. even paid for transportation and 
minimum wage benefits.89 Even after the war ended, the expanding U.S. economy enabled 
employers to keep hiring temporary guest workers, and with every new labor shortage, such as 
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during the Korean War, Mexico was in a position to renegotiate the terms of labor contracts.90 
On average, 200,000 guest workers were employed in the United States between 1948 and 
1964.91  
 Major reform came right after the end of the Bracero program in 1964. Largely in 
response to the Civil Rights movement of the 1960s, Congress passed the 1965 Immigration and 
Nationality Act (INA) to end the race-based discrimination that endured under the quota system. 
In its place, the INA allowed a maximum of 20,000 immigrants for any given country and was 
not based on the current makeup of the United States.92 The law also implemented an ordered 
preference system for immigrants that heavily favored family of citizens and current residents 
and skilled workers or people of “exceptional ability.”93 The shift away from national origin 
quotas changed the makeup of immigrant populations with the majority of immigrants now 
coming from Mexico or Central America. The new policy also had the side effect of increasing 
illegal immigration. The number of apprehensions at the border in 1965 was less than 100,000, 
but by 1985 it increased to over 1.2 million.94 Between the 60s and the 80s, this surge in illegal 
immigration completely changed the face of immigration policy. 
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2.3 Immigration Policy Becomes Illegal Immigration Policy: 1986-Present 
The United States has always shown some level of concern with securing the border, but the 
modern period of policymaking starting in 1986 is marked by a major shift of policy focus from 
legal immigration to illegal immigration. Rather than discussing quotas or other criteria for 
selecting those who can relocate here, the U.S. Congress discusses how to further militarize its 
border with neighboring Mexico. The government in the last thirty years has appropriated an 
over forty billion dollars to the Border Patrol.95 This period can be just as fairly characterized by 
congressional and executive attempts to deal with the illegal population already living in the 
United States. Because deporting millions of people would devastate the American economy, the 
federal government has attempted policies that would allow illegal immigrants to remain in the 
country while also deterring future illegal immigration. 
 The modern policy chapter begins in 1986 with the debate and enactment of the 
Immigration Reform and Control Act (IRCA). For many Republicans in the 2013 Senate debate, 
the IRCA is a direct analogue to the proposed Border Security, Economic Opportunity, and 
Immigration Modernization Act of 2013. The plan for the IRCA was tougher enforcement 
combined with legalization measures and guest worker programs. The bill had four major 
provisions. 
First, the bill targeted employers who hire illegal immigrants as a means to “de-
magnetize the magnet” that incentivized illegal immigration in the first place.96 The new 
employer sanctions were a new enforcement tool for the INS who previously could not punish 
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employers who enabled violations of the law.97 The law made it illegal for employers to 
knowingly hire undocumented aliens, which for the first time punished employers for their role 
in perpetuating border crossings and visa overstays. Penalties ranged from modest fines to prison 
sentences.98 Employers were required to keep records and verify employees’ documentation, 
though they were not penalized if misled by falsified documentation.99 
Second, Congress mandated that the border with Mexico be secured. However, 
considering the emphasis given to fences, patrol agents, surveillance, and other barriers in the 
2013 debate, the requirements in the 1986 bill barely touched on border enforcement. They 
appropriated nearly $450 million to the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) to increase 
the number of agents patrolling the border. The law required that the INS use those funds to 
ensure “that the average level of [border personnel] in each of the fiscal years 1987 and 1988 is 
at least 50 percent higher than such level for fiscal year 1986.”100 These border personnel levels 
proved untenable in the short term as the INS was not able to recruit and train people fast enough 
to come anywhere near the IRCA’s goal.101 
Third, Congress expanded the temporary guest worker program, similar to the Bracero 
program. The program allowed illegal immigrants working in agriculture to be put on a path to 
citizenship, opened the doors for employers to hire more foreign workers, and even provided 
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financial benefits to the workers coming in, benefits such as housing and travel costs.102 Union 
groups and Hispanic advocacy groups railed against the proposed influx of new workers because 
it would lower wages for Americans. Despite this opposition, the powerful western agriculture 
lobby pushed the guest worker program forward to give businesses access to cheaper labor.103 
Finally, illegal immigrants who entered the United States prior to January 1, 1982 were 
eligible for legalization if they were healthy, paid a fee to the attorney general, lived in the U.S. 
continuously since 1982, and had not been convicted of a crime. They had to spend 18 months in 
temporary status before applying for permanent status. Anyone who was legalized under this 
program was not allowed welfare benefits from most agencies for at least five years, including 
social security.104 This provision is notorious in the 2013 debate as the “amnesty” provision that 
legalized three million people in the hopes that the country would never have to do it again. 
Despite the grand bargain of legalization and enforcement, the IRCA failed to curtail the 
stream of illegal immigration. By 1989, the United States faced a surge of border crossings.105 
Although Congress drastically increased the funding for the agency, the INS was also stretched 
thin after the IRCA passed. The enlarged border patrol did help prevent more crossings. 
However, the INS’s mission broadened to include drug enforcement and employer sanctioning, 
and, as a result, the percentage of border patrol officers’ hours on “line watch” dropped to 38% 
in 1989.106 The new law also did almost nothing to deter employers from hiring illegal 
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immigrants or to prevent employer discrimination, despite anti-discrimination statutes in the 
bill.107 It was difficult for employers to validate the status of workers based on documentation, 
and an entire industry arose for false documentation.108 Overall, the IRCA only had a modest 
impact on the INS’s ability to prevent illegal immigration, and the problem continued to develop.  
The next major attempt to curtail illegal immigration came in 1996 with the Illegal 
Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act (IIRIRA). Unlike the balance Congress 
struck between compassion and enforcement ten years earlier, the new law was all stick and no 
carrot. It increased money for fencing and doubled the size of the Border Patrol over the next few 
years.109 IIRIRA also added provisions to disincentivize illegal activity. It imposed new penalties 
for smuggling, using false documentation, or overstaying visas. Those who were found in the 
country illegally and deported were barred from returning for a period of three to ten years.110  
Congress also sped up deportation procedures by making it more difficult to challenge the INS’s 
deportation decision in court.111 As long as immigrants were not claiming political asylum, this 
“expedited removal” allowed the INS to detain and deport them without any sort of hearing.112 
Finally, the law made it more difficult for immigrants to attain governmental benefits, which 
effectively put more stress on private charity groups which could not handle the new demand for 
services.113 
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Scholars are almost unanimously critical of the 1996 legislation, though for different 
reasons. Aristide Zolberg calls the bill a “total failure,” noting that illegal immigration increased 
drastically in the 1990s and reached its high point at 968,000 in 1999.114 Ann Chih Lin and 
Melysa Sperber both explain that the buildup of border security has merely pushed the flow of 
illegal immigrants into more isolated areas, such as the desert, where the harsh conditions can 
make border crossing a deadly endeavor, and Joseph Nevins argues that the reliance of illegal 
immigrants on smugglers has actually turned illegal immigration into a form of “organized 
crime.” 115 The only positive note came from the 2009 Independent Task Force Report on 
Immigration. It shows that the 1996 law tripled the number of deportations from 60,000 in 1996 
to 180,000 in 1997, which was a clear goal of the law. The report also claims that the 1996 
reforms were part of “impressive” efforts to secure the border.116 Clearly, scholars agree that the 
law increased border security, though not whether the increased security is beneficial for overall 
immigration reform. 
Despite the IIRIRA’s goal of securing the border, the military buildup at the border 
certainly did not end in 1996. After the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, the public and 
Congress found new resolve to address immigration. The INS came under intense scrutiny after 
the attacks for its failure to enforce immigration laws, specifically because at least two of the 
hijackers entered the United States legally and then overstayed their visas. Had the entry-exit 
system mandated by the 1996 law been implemented, the federal government would have known 
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that they were still in the country.117 In fact, the INS in 2002 ineptly sent notifications to the dead 
hijackers that their student visas were approved and that they were now eligible for flight-
training programs.118 After 9/11, the issue of immigration was no longer one of economic, 
political, or cultural power—now, immigration was again a matter of national security.119 The 
INS was dismantled in December 2002 and its functions were taken over by the new Department 
of Homeland Security.  
New restrictive policies post-9/11 may have been targeted at Muslim-American groups, 
but they had major impacts on all immigrants. For instance, a new policy required immigrants to 
notify the federal government within ten days of a change of address. Many immigrants were 
subject to deportation either because they were not aware of the new requirement or because 
their notifications were caught in the backlog of government paperwork.120 Restrictions on 
immigrants only continued to increase after 9/11. Despite an attempt from 2005 to 2007 to 
hammer out a comprehensive immigration reform law, Congress only came up with more 
security bills with no path to legalization.121 The Real ID Act of 2005 made it more difficult to 
prove a legitimate asylum claim, and it set higher standards of identification prior to obtaining a 
driver’s license.122 The Border Protection, Antiterrorism, and Illegal immigration Control Act of 
2005 increased surveillance at the border, empowered local sheriffs to enforce immigration laws, 
appropriated funds to construct 700 miles of border fencing, mandated employers verify 
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immigration status, turned “unlawful presence” into a federal crime, and made it illegal to assist 
undocumented immigrants.123 Lastly, Congress passed the Secure Fence Act of 2006 to add even 
more fencing to the existing provisions.124  
All of these laws have added up to an increasingly militarized border. By 2013, the 
Border Patrol had over 20,000 agents, most of whom guarded the southern border with 
Mexico.125  Nearly a third (650 miles) of the U.S.-Mexican border is fenced. Border Patrol 
spending increased by nearly a factor of ten between 1993 and 2013 to go from $362 million to 
$3.47 billion each year.126 Overall border enforcement spending sat at $18 billion as of 2013, a 
number which amounts to more than the budgets of all other federal law enforcement agencies 
combined.127  It is difficult to know the exact number of illegal entrants to the country in any 
given year, but senators generally agreed in the 2013 debate that roughly 11 million illegal 
immigrants resided in the United States.  
The modern immigration debate thus can be defined by its focus on illegal immigration, 
both how to stop the flow of illegal immigrants coming into the country and how to treat the 
immigrants here compassionately. After 1986, Congress took up the mantra “security first.” It 
has spent the last thirty years adding resources to the Border Patrol and creating new restrictions 
for employers to disincentivize illegal hiring. With the failure of the 2007 comprehensive 
                                                 
123
 Thomas Allen O’Rourke, “Good Samaritans, Beware: The Sensenbrenner-King Bill and Assistance to 
Undocumented Migrants,” The Harvard Latino Law Review 9 (2006). 
 
124
 Givens, Freeman, and Leal, 25; Reed Karaim, “America’s Border Fence: Will It Stem the Flow of 
Illegal Immigrants?” CQ Researcher 18, no. 32 (2008). 
 
125
 Seghetti. 
 
126
 “Enacted Border Patrol Budget by Fiscal Year,” U.S. Customs and Border Protection, 2014, 
http://www.cbp.gov/sites/default/files/documents/BP%20Budget%20History%201990-2014_0.pdf  
 
127
 Ted Hesson, “Report: U.S. Spends More on Immigration Than All Federal Criminal Enforcement 
Combined,” ABC News, 7 Jan. 2013, http://abcnews.go.com/ABC_Univision/News/us-spends-immigration-major-
federal-criminal-enforcement-combined/story?id=18151143  
46 
 
immigration reform bill hanging over its head, the 2013 Senate tried to build upon the 
momentum of President Obama’s reelection and finally pass a bill that addressed both security 
and legalization at the same time. 
 
2.4 Conclusion 
Any understanding of American immigration policy must always be rooted in both historical and 
legislative context. Long term trends in immigration policy follow familiar patterns. Restrictive 
policies come on the heels of either economic downturn or upon the public perception of a 
foreign threat. When their economic or national security is at stake, Americans frequently view 
immigrants as both a potential threat and a scapegoat for their problems. French “radicals” and 
Muslim “terrorists” alike inspire fear for our national safety, while Chinese, Mexican, and 
Central American immigrants seem to be seen as threatening the power of the American working 
class.  
 In congruence with American history, the national debate today is premised on protecting 
the country from foreign incursion by “illegals,” on making Americans feel secure. Scholars may 
vehemently oppose the characterization of immigrants as threatening, but policy debates today 
rest on the assumption that illegal immigrants threaten the state and that the Southern border 
needs to be militarized. The question is not whether to ease the country’s stance on immigration 
but how to best compensate for its vulnerability.    
 The legislative context shows a generation of failure to prevent illegal immigration. The 
Senate has thirty years of increased enforcement provisions with generally bad results. 
Therefore, the 2013 debate is just as much characterized by an effort to explain past failures as it 
is to provide security. Indeed, considering that many senators were around for the passage of the 
47 
 
1986 IRCA law, a sense of frustration permeates the debate. As I will show in the next chapter, 
the question of blame is central to the debate over immigration. 
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3 Contextual Ambiguity in the Legislation-behind-the-Legislation 
Law as integrity denies that statements of law are either backward-looking factual reports 
of conventionalism or forward-looking instrumental programs of legal pragmatism. It 
insists that legal claims are interpretive judgments and therefore combine backward- and 
forward-looking elements; they interpret contemporary legal practice seen as an 
unfolding political narrative . . . . The adjudicative principle of integrity instructs judges 
to identify legal rights and duties, so far as possible, on the assumption that they were all 
created by a single author—the community personified—expressing a coherent 
conception of justice and fairness.  
 
 —Ronald Dworkin, Law’s Empire, 1986128 
 
 Ronald Dworkin, the leading legal theorist of the late twentieth century, emphasizes the 
importance of continuity in the law. Legal acts require some understanding of a cohesive 
narrative, a unified will that transcends any given judge.129 He introduces the mythical character 
Hercules as an ideal adjudicator with knowledge of all past law. Thus, Hercules is the perfect 
“author” to interpret the law because he had full knowledge of all past constitutions, statutes, 
common law, and legal decisions and is able to fit any law he interprets into that context. In other 
words, Hercules understands the law better than anyone else because he has perfect 
understanding of context.  
 Unlike judges, members of Congress are not under pressure from the judicial myth which 
demands consistency to just “follow the law.” Legislation presumes a problem exists in the 
world. Rather than an act of consistency, it is by definition an act of change. Thus, the rhetorical 
challenge for proponents of an immigration bill is to establish inconsistency from past attempts 
at immigration reform, while opponents will do the opposite by trying to establish consistency 
with failed policies from the past. In this case, both sides establish the motivating force behind 
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past immigration policy to construct the 2013 bill as either consistent or inconsistent with past 
failed reforms. 
In this chapter, I argue that as an enactment, legislation is contextually ambiguous. 
Senators in the immigration debate redefine the legislative act by redefining the context. 
Drawing on Burke, I call these contextual constructions the “legislation-behind-the-
legislation.”130 By reconstructing the history of immigration policy, senators are able to define 
the 2013 immigration bill as congruent with that history. The legislation-behind-the-legislation 
offers leverage on the bill from the outside. First, I explain how we can understand the law 
outside of itself by viewing it as an enactment. I then explain how opponents frame the policy 
history to argue that the 2013 legislation is merely another in a long line of broken promises. 
Opponents thus construct a scene of bad acts (promises) where Congress has been disempowered 
from enacting its preferred reforms. Proponents, on the other hand, reconstruct the policy history 
to argue that border security has traditionally been increased, and they feature Congress as an 
active agent getting its way. The contextualizing work reorients how we should think about 
blame for past policy failures, which, as I show in chapter four, informs how senators interpret 
statutes in the 2013 legislation. 
 
3.1 Understanding the Law as an Enactment 
Legislative interpretations cannot be confined the letter of the law. Contextualizing provides a 
tempting secondary means of interpreting law that can either complement or substitute for 
statutory interpretation. Contextualizing becomes unnecessary if one takes a plain fact view of 
the law where the law is straightforward and speaks for itself. Burke says that judicial 
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interpretation maintains this fiction of “positive law” where judges pretend that they are getting 
at the law in-and-of itself and thus do not need anything outside the language of statutes.131 
However, according to Burke, if judges are interpreting a legal document like the United States 
Constitution, such an interpretation resists confinement to the language of the text “since an act 
in the United States has not merely the United States Constitution as its background, but all sorts 
of factors originating outside it, the fiction of positive law has generally served to set up the 
values, traditions, and trends of business as the Constitution-behind-the-Constitution that is to be 
consulted as criterion.”132 Burke explains, in other words, that legal interpretation cannot be 
contained within the document itself because the document “itself is an enactment.”133 The fact 
that it was enacted contextualizes it within a given scene, as a result of specific agents, by way of 
an agency, and towards a purpose. Burke says the U.S. Constitution, for instance, was enacted as 
a reactionary measure and that it was a capitalist Constitution.134  
Legal theorists make similar points about the intrusion of context into statutory 
interpretation, especially when the language of a statute is unclear. A century ago, Oliver 
Wendell Holmes explained that the uncertainty of language forces judges to consider not just 
what a word means now but what a word meant then when the statute was first written. 135 Judges 
justify their interpretations by looking to meanings and intentions of the legislature and thus 
drawing the audience’s attention to extratextual evidence in order to understand what the legal 
                                                 
131
 Ibid.  
 
132
 Ibid, 362-363. 
 
133
 Ibid, 362. 
 
134
 Ibid. 
 
135
 Oliver Wendell Holmes, “The Theory of Legal Interpretation,” Harvard Law Review, Vol. XII 1898-
1899 (Cambridge, MA: The Harvard Law Review Publishing Association, 1899), 417-418. 
51 
 
document says.136 This often involves looking at the history of a bill’s enactment, including 
committee markups and floor debates, in order to discern the legislature’s original intentions.137 
In fact, policymakers will often try to sneak language into committee reports that would not have 
made it into the final bill in order to influence the courts’ interpretation of legislative intent.138 
Although not without its textualist critics, legislative intent has long been used by the courts as a 
justification for interpreting the law.139 The legal act is necessarily defined by this context, not 
just by critics but by the rhetors engaging in its public interpretation.  
In the same way that there exists a “Constitution-behind-the-Constitution,” there also is a 
legislation that lurks behind the legislation. Whenever members of Congress interpret what a bill 
does, they always look beyond the language of the bill to understand the context of its enactment. 
Following Burke’s lead, I argue that indirect constructions of legislative acts rely on leveraging 
different terms of the pentad. Since I am trying to understand ambiguity in the legislative act, the 
bill itself, for the purposes of this analysis, must be considered the act in this pentadic set. 
Because of humanity’s desire for form, Burke says that we seek consistency between different 
terms of the pentad.140 Therefore, our sense of the legislative act must match up with our 
understanding of the other terms in the pentadic set: scene, agent, agency, and purpose. By 
leveraging other terms, senators can redefine the act, resulting different interpretations of the 
legislative act.  
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In what follows, I show how senators leverage the scene and agent to reconstruct the 
legislative act. They are, in other words, contextualizing factors that redefine the legislative act. 
Ultimately, the legislation-behind-the-legislation is a resource for creating ambiguity in proposed 
laws and helps explain how senators can disagree about what the immigration bill does. 
 
3.2 Opponents’ Policy History: A Line of Broken Promises 
Scholars in the rhetoric and public policy literature are no strangers to constructions of a 
legislative scene. An approach consistent with this scholarship might look at how senators 
construct the immigration system as “broken” and the border as insecure. The scene would be so 
overpowering as to necessitate new immigration legislation that would beef up border security 
and streamline the legal immigration system. In this sense, the scene does help define the 
legislation, but such an analysis still relies on stability in the meaning of said legislation. It relies 
on legislation functioning as a social fact. Because my interest here is in legislation’s 
ambiguities, I take a different perspective. I look at how senators leverage our understanding of 
the policy scene to understand not just the need for legislation but also to alter our understanding 
of what legislation does. 
Although scene is typically characterized as place, Burke says scene refers to any kind of 
background, including history.141 Thus, scene may include time as well as location. Asen 
explains that time is a fundamental consideration in policy debates, serving both as context and 
appeal. Members of Congress in policy debates may vary widely on where the debate exists in 
time. For example, some lawmakers may think that the privatization debates died in 2005, while 
others may believe we are still having them. Asen refers to this as the “meta quality” that long-
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lasting debates facilitate—policymakers will “debate their debates.” 142 Participants understand 
past policy debates in ways that inform their current positions.  
Different conceptions of time cannot simply be chalked up to different sensibilities. Time 
serves as rhetorical appeal when policymakers invoke old debates to bolster their own positions 
considering that context, after all, can be strategically defined. In legislative debates, members of 
Congress do not merely point to recent legislative history, but they also construct their own 
history of events. They decidedly make a choice, and the long history of immigration policy 
provides ample ways to outline and present history.143 Senators on both sides construct the 
legislative history of immigration in order to leverage what the current legislation means. 
Opponents envision a legislation-behind-the-legislation that is scenic and disempowers 
Congress from enacting the changes it wants. They draw on past failures to define current 
legislation as another act in a long line of faulty promises. The 1986 Immigration Reform and 
Control Act is especially present as a proven failure, and opponents frame it as the closest 
analogue to the 2013 bill. Senator John Thune (R-SD) calls 1986 “promises that were never 
kept.”144 Senator John Cornyn (R-TX) references a “trail of broken promises…that dates back to 
at least 1986.”145 Grassley laments that the Senate is repeating the mistakes of 1986 because  
while “the sponsors of this bill want you to believe it is different from the 1986 legislation…the 
bill is legalization first, enforcement later—and I have to add, enforcement later, if ever.”146 
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Opponents make 1986 the central analogue because it was the last immigration law that included 
some form of amnesty. By granting presence to the “mass fraud” of 1986, they focus less on 
legislation from 1996, 2001, and 2007, all of which involved massive increases in border 
security spending without any measures to legalize, making “legalization first” seem like the 
prevailing policy.147  
1986 is the most prevalent reference point, but other failures in the modern immigration 
debate are also sometimes referenced as evidence of the futility of congressional demands. For 
instance, Senator Jeff Sessions (R-AL) raises the long history of entry/exit requirements, noting 
that Congress required biometric entry/exit systems be implemented with bills in 1996, 2000, 
2002, and 2004 with no follow-up by the executive branch.148 Thune also points to the provisions 
in the 1996 and 2006 laws requiring 700 miles of border fence, and he claims that only 40 miles 
of fencing have been built by DHS.149 
The language of the broken “promise” ties the past debates to the current one as “promises” 
of the past are connected to the “promises” of the present. According to Lee, the 2013 bill is “full 
of promises to beef up border security, but it makes no assurances.”150 Senator Bob Corker (R-
TN) is quite explicit that he “[doesn’t] believe we are going to add 20,000 agents . . . . They are 
making promises 10 years down the road that I am saying are not likely to ever happen.”151 
Senator Dan Coats (R-IN) admits that the entry/exit system, border security, and employee 
verification have been strengthened, but that’s only “assuming the promises come true” and 
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“they have only been strengthened on a piece of paper.”152 Through the common term 
“promises,” opponents connect current legislation to a scene of policy failures. To understand the 
likely legislative act, senators point to a policy trail. 
Although “promising” could be an act rather than a scene, the “promises” almost never have 
an active agent, and are best understood as scene. Edward Appel observes that the construction 
of a sentence with its subject, predicate, adjectives, and adverbs mirrors the functions of pentadic 
terms, thus sentence structure can tell us something about the motivational formulas that rhetors 
employ.153 If, as Burke argues, the pentadic terms represent fundamental forms of human 
thought, then it makes sense that our syntax reflects those forms.154 In the most basic sense, 
active voice puts the agent in control of the action, whereas passive voice puts the agent as the 
receiver of action.155 Because opponents favor passive voice, broken legislative promises just 
become a thing to point to, sheer motion. As Rountree and Rountree point out, rhetors will often 
shift to a scenic terminology in order to avoid responsibility.156 If senators put too much focus on 
allocating blame for past faulty promises, then they inevitably would have to indict themselves 
because many Republican senators, such as Grassley, voted for the 1986 law, and many 
Republican administrations since then have held responsibility for enforcing border security.  
In opponents’ passive sentence constructions, proponents, mostly Democrats, can be 
designated as the active agents of current promises, but past promises are more obscure. Senator 
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Marco Rubio (R-FL) says that “for over three decades and despite many promises to enforce the 
law, the Federal government under both Republicans and Democrats has failed to do so.”157 
While Rubio certainly directs some blame at his own party, the responsible agent for promising 
enforcement is uncertain. Even if we accept that “the Federal government” is the agent, Rubio 
separates Republican and Democrat from this agent by embedding them both in a prepositional 
phrase. Just because the federal government was “under” the direction of one party or another 
does not necessarily indict them for breaking promises. He repeats his promises line on the next 
page of the Record: “In just the two years that I have been here, I have seen the games played 
and the promises broken and how the American people ultimately suffer the consequences,” and 
“after promises made in the past on immigration have not been kept….”158 Again, promises are 
broken, but it is not clear who is breaking the promises. They are just something that Rubio 
witnesses, a landscape of broken promises endemic to Washington.  
Similarly, Cornyn explains that “when so many promises have been made in the past that 
have not been kept, I think it is unreasonable to ask the American people to just trust us.”159 
Cornyn here seems to indict the Congress, but the indictment comes because of the scene. He 
does not actively put the Congress as the agent of broken promises; instead, the Congress is 
simply indicted by the existence of past failures. A moment later, he does add an active agent to 
the promises: “if we deal with the experience that we have had from 1986 and other times when 
we made extravagant promises to the American people how we are going to fix the system, only 
to find that those promises have not been kept.”160 He acknowledges that Congress through the 
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pronoun “we” made the “extravagant promises,” but through the passive construction “promises 
have not been kept,” he does not grant Congress responsibility for actually failing. In all of these 
instances, opponents to the legislation use passive constructions to build a scene of broken 
“promises,” and the scene implicates the current legislation as merely another “promise.”  
Scenic constructions also help Republicans avoid blaming Ronald Reagan for the 1986 
reform that he signed into law. If Congress is not responsible for past immigration policy, the 
presidency appears to be the obvious scapegoat, but they do not want to attribute fault to the 
father of modern conservatism. Cornyn says that “Reagan signed based on the premise that there 
would be enforcement and no need to ever provide another amnesty again, that this would 
actually be enforced. . . .”161 Cornyn does not put Reagan as an active agent in enforcing the law, 
even though he is the head of the executive branch. Instead, he signed it because he believed in 
faulty “premises,” and the blame for failing to enforce the law remains mysterious. Lack of 
enforcement is still embedded in passive phrases that exonerate Reagan as a tragic victim of 
some mysterious, hidden agent that subverted the will of both Congress and Reagan.  
Coats acknowledges that Reagan signed the 1986 law but that “promises made then were not 
fulfilled.”162 Thus, we see similar passive construction, but Coats follows this scenic construction 
of “promises” up with an invocation to be more like Reagan: “The way, in my opinion, to 
address [broken promises] is—to borrow from Ronald Reagan trust, but verify.”163 In fact, this 
“trust, but verify” language is picked up by Senator David Vitter (R-LA), Senator Rand Paul (R-
KY), and Cornyn.164 Paul even names his proposed amendment for increased border security the 
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“Trust, but Verify” amendment.165 Far from a scapegoat, Reagan is a model for immigration 
reform. He is not responsible for past failures.  
In sum, opponents feature a scene of broken promises as the context to understand the 
current legislation. S. 744 is just another promise that Congress sees. Congress is disempowered. 
Rather than actively changing policy, it has witnessed a failure to enforce the law over the years. 
While the passage of time makes it difficult to pin the policy failures on any one agent, the 
implication of broken promises is that a subversive agent does exist. However, until opponents 
get into the statutory construction of the legislation, which I will discuss in the next chapter, the 
sequence of acts that makes up the policy scene lies in wait for an active agent to take 
responsibility for decades of failure. 
 
3.3 Proponents’ Policy History: “We Have Done ‘Enforcement First’” 
Proponents construct an entirely different legislation-behind-the-legislation, one with active 
agents. Instead of a line of broken promises, the Congress has traditionally increased border 
security. Congress, for proponents, becomes an active agent of change. Rather than see 
immigration policy happen, Congress makes it happen. 
First of all, proponents construct a different scene from opponents based on more recent 
legislation. Their scene is one of heavily increased border security. Senator Bob Menendez (D-
NJ) clearly demonstrates that different legislative histories can be drawn for any given bill before 
the Congress. He criticizes the opposition for only comparing the legislation to 1986 because “if 
there are lessons to be learned from 1986, there are just as many to be learned from the last 10 
years in which ‘enforcement first’ has been the mantra of Congress’s immigration policy, with 
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disastrous results.”166 Senator Tom Carper (D-DE) presents a slideshow on the floor comparing 
the borders in 2013 to those in 2007 to argue that they are much more secure, and he attributes 
this security to the “unprecedented investments we have made in securing our borders over the 
past decade.”167 Menendez also shows charts, documenting the increase in border spending over 
the past 26 years from $1.2 billion in 1986 to its high point at $20 billion in 2009.168 The point, 
thus, is not that the border is necessarily secure now but that the policy history is one of 
increased enforcement. The proponents argue that the bill before the Senate is likely to actually 
increase enforcement because the government has a past record of doing so. 
More importantly, proponents feature Congress as an active agent in changing the scene. 
The contrast in sentence construction between opponents and proponents is striking even by 
simply considering the slogan “enforcement first.” Leahy asserts that “we have done 
‘enforcement first.’”169 In his active sentence construction with the subject “we” and the verb 
“have done,” Leahy empowers Congress as the agent of change in immigration policy. 
Menendez asserts that the public has grown tired of the current system: “It was a rejection of the 
enforcement-only strategy and the idea that we must secure the border first.”170 Just like Leahy, 
he puts Congress in the driver’s seat. By contrast, opponents make Congress passive on 
enforcement first. Cruz asks “Which comes first, legalization or border security? The Gang of 8 
bill says let’s have legalization first.”171 In the first sentence, he puts the active subjects as 
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“legalization” and “border security” paired with the verb “come.” In the second sentence, he 
suggests we can “have” a resulting policy but does not explicitly say Congress actively legalizes. 
Sessions mirrors Cruz’s construction that we want to “have” enforcement first, followed by the 
observation “the sponsors were originally saying that their bill was enforcement first.”172 
Enforcement first, in this case, is just a state of being.  
Going beyond the slogan of “enforcement first,” proponents in general conceptualize a scene 
of border security that has been actively changed by Congress. McCain has seen the growth of 
the Border Patrol from 4,000 to 21,000, the use of drones, the building of fences, and the 
deployment of the National Guard to the border.173 He uses the phrase “I have seen” three times, 
suggesting a similar passive construction as opponents. However, his constructions change 
almost immediately to put Congress as the active agent securing the border. “We have to do 
more. We have to do a lot more.”174 Given the immediate context of the things McCain has 
“seen,” he credits Congress with the increased border security. Further, he follows up these 
observations by discussing Congress’s active role in the future: “We can purchase a lot of 
equipment that way. We are going to use the Army. We are going to use the Army to tell us how 
we can best surveil and enforce this border….”175 His continued use of “we” plus an active verb 
affirms that Congress has power over immigration policy, specifically over the border. Senator 
Bill Nelson (D-FL) notes that the borders are “a lot more secure now than they were just a few 
years ago.”176 Senator Mark Udall (D-CO) calls the government’s commitment to border security 
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“proven record” because the United States has historically increased border enforcement.177 He 
says “we have made some real progress,” “we have ramped up law enforcement and are 
deporting more criminals than ever before,” “we can do more,” and “we spend a lot of resources 
on immigration and customs enforcement.”178  
By reconstructing legislative history, both sides of the bill try to redefine the probable 
legislative act being undertaken on the floor. If Congress has traditionally increased border 
security, then the bill is likely to follow through on security provisions. If, on the other hand, 
Congress is not capable of actively increasing border security, then the legislation is merely 
another faulty “promise.”  
  
3.4 Conclusion 
When senators consider legislation as an enactment and not merely as a thing unto itself, they are 
necessarily pushed behind the legislation. They construct a legislation-behind-the-legislation to 
contextualize bills. In the courtroom, judges must establish a history of legal precedents to fit 
their decisions as consistent with that context. The law has a single guiding principle throughout 
history, even if decisions are overturned. By contrast, I have shown that the presumption in 
Congress leans towards discontinuity with past policy failures. Members thus are forced to 
define the legislation as congruent or incongruent with previous legislation.  
 Both sides in the immigration debate create a legislation-behind-the-legislation that 
informs how they understand the 2013 bill, bringing context to bear on text. Opponents attribute 
blame for bad past policies to a subversive scene—they do not identify the subversive agent 
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within that scene, but they do escape blame themselves through passive constructions. Congress 
is not responsible for the failures since 1986. Instead, Congress has witnessed failure to enforce 
its wishes. Proponents, on the other hand, do pin the blame on Congress for its “enforcement 
first” measures that favor border security to the detriment of legalization. Congress, thus, is an 
active agent defining immigration policy. The two sides thus disagree about the efficacy of 
Congress in enacting reforms and about whether the 2013 bill does what it demands to be done.  
 In the next chapter, I bring these constructions of the legislation-behind-the-legislation to 
bear on the statutory arguments in the 2013 debate. By establishing the motivating force behind 
past policies in either a subversive scene or a subversive Congress, senators anticipate probable 
acts that will occur under different statutory constructions, even if those different constructions 
are designed to achieve the same result. The question becomes which statutory constructions will 
favor discontinuity with past failures by disempowering the subversive elements. 
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4 Statutory Ambiguity in the Policy Lottery 
The interpretation of constitutional principles must not be too literal. We must remember 
that the machinery of government would not work if it were not allowed a little play in its 
joints.  
 —Oliver Wendell Holmes, Bain Peanut Co. v. Pinson, 1931179 
 
 Oliver Wendell Holmes’ widely cited metaphor, “play in its joints,” provokes us to think 
about the law as flexible, as partially ambiguous. The administration of government relies on 
ceding some interpretive power to those executing the law, so while it may be tempting to think 
of the law as compelling action it actually sets a framework for action. There are multiple correct 
ways to follow the law, both from the perspective of citizens and from the perspective of 
executive departments and agencies. After all, according to Habermas, modern law is largely 
justified on rights which “fix the limits within which a subject is entitled to freely exercise her 
will.”180 Statutes depend, to some extent, on this freedom to act flexibly, but flexibility also 
provides the potential for interpretation and subversive acts. Congress tries to craft statutes that 
exclude interpretations antagonistic to congressional intent. 
 In this chapter, I uncover the uncertainty and moments for strategic ambiguity in the 
statutory interpretation of legislation. In the immigration bill, the border security and legalization 
“triggers” by far produce the most contestation. My analysis of the competing interpretations of 
the trigger language indicates that statutory construction is a battle for interpretive authority, 
involving subversive potentialities of action within the legal framework created by the bill. Thus, 
statutory uncertainty arises not in considering legislation as a congressional act but as an agency 
for future executive and congressional action. A bill’s language is ambiguous not just in what it 
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does but also in what it allows. As I show, senators have trouble agreeing on what the 
immigration bill does because they each reconstruct the motives of potential interpreters, 
including the president, Congress, the Secretary of Homeland Security, and even border control 
agents. These potential interpreters can affect the way the law is administered once it is passed, 
potentially redefining the nature of the legislative act. Their potential to subvert the intent of 
legislators creates uncertainty around the legislation. Thus, where the previous chapter dealt 
largely with scene, statutory construction directs our attention to agents who hold interpretive 
power. 
 To make this argument, first I explain how Congress faces a “policy lottery” whenever it 
passes legislation with respect to how the law will be enforced. Then, I review the key debate in 
the Senate immigration debate over border security “triggers.” Next, I analyze how opponents 
and proponents interpret subversive potential in the statutory construction of the triggers. 
Opponents see a potential executive subversion of border security requirements, and proponents 
find potential congressional subversion of legalization requirements. I conclude that the policy 
lottery is a rhetorical resource that leaves enough ambiguity for senators to pry multiple 
subversive interpretations from a statute. 
4.1 Uncertainty in the Policy Lottery 
Congress has an control problem in policymaking because it does not carry out its own policy 
directives nor does it interpret statutes once they leave Capitol Hill.181 While the judiciary may 
be the ultimate interpreter of laws, the initial interpretation comes through the executive 
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departments and agencies which have to implement the legislation.182 As Habermas points out, 
the law is implemented and interpreted by administrations that “exercise a rather broad 
discretion.”183 Legislative action certainly amounts to an act of Congress, but it also contains acts 
of the executive branch. In other words, Congress sets the framework by which executive 
departments and agencies act. Ambiguously worded statutes allow for maximum executive 
leeway while specifically worded statutes constrain what agencies can do, but the passing of 
legislation will always entail a policy lottery where the ultimate outcome of policy is uncertain 
but the probability of certain outcomes can be weighed.184 For example, Congress wrote a two-
page joint resolution for the 2001 Authorization for Use of Military Force which gave the 
president authorization for “appropriate and necessary force” against those “he determines 
planned, authorized, committed, or aided the terrorist attacks that occurred on September 11, 
2001.”185 This ambiguous statute allowed maximum leeway for President Bush to respond to the 
September 11 terror attacks and gave the president the power to determine what Congress 
essentially did with that joint resolution. By contrast, the 1991 Authorization for Use of Military 
Force stipulated that the first President Bush was allowed to use force only to enforce specific 
United Nations Security Council Resolutions and further required that he confirm that he has 
attempted all peaceful means of resolution prior to the authorization of force.186 Potential 
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executive acts are always lurking beneath the surface of any statutory construction because 
members of Congress are not sure exactly what the executive will do with legislation. 
 In light of the policy lottery, Congress has good reason to scrutinize executive branch 
actions while drafting legislation because statutory construction can present major power 
struggles between the executive and the legislative branches. The Department of Homeland 
Security, for example, could circumvent the intention of Congress and interpret a statute in a way 
favorable to its policy goals. This power struggle helps explain, for example, why authors of 
legislation add definitions to key terms in order to limit the flexibility of executive departments 
and agencies and the courts.187 Definitions allow the legislature to create more legal certainty 
when there may be multiple meanings to common words, so the choice of vocabulary may 
dictate the choice of laws.188   
 If Congress wants to maintain control over executive interpretation, then it needs to 
account for why it would ever write ambiguous statutes. The law and political science literature 
provide four possible reasons for such ambiguity. First, departments and agencies need some 
administrative flexibility for changing circumstances.189 This flexibility allows the executive 
branch to deal with new circumstances not anticipated by the original authors of the law. Second, 
legislators are fearful of attentive publics, so they will want to shift responsibility for as many 
rules as possible to federal agencies, whose leaders do not face electoral pressures. In other 
words, the public will not hold them responsible for unpopular provisions but will instead blame 
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the executive for misinterpreting statutes.190 Thus, they leave the option of an executive 
scapegoat. Third, members of Congress may actually benefit from a runaway bureaucracy 
upsetting constituents by making decisions based on ambiguous statutes.191 Because constituent 
services are low-risk ways to drum up support, the more federal agencies create trouble for 
constituents, the more opportunities members have to step in on their behalf and fix the 
problem.192 Finally, Congress may not be able to agree on exact language, so delegation to 
executive agencies gives members a way to vote for reform without having to agree on all the 
details.193  
 Congress cannot completely control how the executive branch enacts legislation; the 
legislative process inevitably involves delegation of interpretive authority. Sometimes members 
even rely on this delegation of authority because the resulting ambiguity provides a rhetorical 
resource to deny responsibility for controversial policies. Congress, however, has some capacity 
to inhibit the executive by writing more specific statutes. In the opposition’s attempts to inhibit 
executive subversion, it necessarily shifts interpretive authority to Congress, which raises the 
proposition’s fears that Congress will grant itself subversive power. As I show in the next 
section, the relative specificity of the statutes and their constraint of the interpretive authority sit 
at the heart of the 2013 senate immigration debate. 
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4.2 The “Trigger” Debate 
Opponents and proponents disagree about whether the immigration bill provides more border 
security. Opponents claim it does nothing to ensure border security. Vitter says that the bill “at 
its core, it is amnesty now, enforcement later, and maybe never.”194 Sessions repeats this 
characterization asserting “Right. Amnesty—done. The promise of enforcement, the toughest bill 
ever in the future—no, sir, not there, not close.”195 Lee insists that “the bill we are debating has 
very little, if anything, to make the border more secure or at least to guarantee that it will become 
more secure as a result of its passage.”196 Meanwhile, proponents tout heavy increases in border 
security. Leahy calls it “virtually impossible to have more security [in the bill].”197 Schumer 
scoffs at the suggestion that border security isn’t present, “as if the $6.5 billion does not 
count.”198 Even McCain was taken aback by the opposition, asking “Is it possible that one could 
ever argue against this legislation now by saying that it does not give us a secure border?”199 
Both sides agree that the bill should provide for more border security, but they do not agree 
whether it achieves that objective. 
When it comes to the specific language of the bill, opponents focus their border security 
concerns on the “trigger” statutes. Essentially, the border has to be secured by the Department of 
Homeland Security prior to the legalization of illegal immigrants who already reside in the 
United States. Securing the border will “trigger” the legalization process. Section 3(c)(2)—
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“Adjustment of Status of Registered Provisional Immigrants”—details what the Secretary must 
accomplish before moving immigrants with RPI status to more permanent legalizations.200 
Notably, section 3(c)(2)(A)(ii) requires her to “certify that there is in place along the Southern 
Border no fewer than 700 miles of pedestrian fencing which will include replacement of all 
currently existing vehicle fencing on non-tribal lands on the Southern Border with pedestrian 
fencing where possible,” and section 3(c)(2)(A)(v) specifies that the Secretary may not adjust 
RPI status until “no fewer than 38,405 trained full-time active duty U.S. Border Patrol agents are 
deployed, stationed, and maintained along the Southern Border.”201 In addition, section 5(a)(3) 
provides a long list of minimum requirements for the border security plan the Secretary must 
implement.202 Even with these extensive provisions, opponents worry that the triggers have no 
teeth. 
It may seem counterintuitive for the debate over a 1200 page piece of legislation to turn 
on one section. However, the meaning of legislation often does turn on one provision or even one 
phrase. For example, the oral arguments of King v. Burwell showed that the entire force of 
marketplace subsidies in the Affordable Care Act may hang on the word “such.”203 Certainly, 
with any legislative debate, more statutory disputes will arise than can be addressed in one 
analysis. I have chosen to focus on the trigger amendments because they are the most prevalent 
site of statutory contestation in the debate, as evidenced by the sheer number of amendments 
dedicated to changing the trigger statutes. Amendments present a good starting point for isolating 
a legislative controversy because they give insight into the bill that opponents would prefer. Out 
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of seventeen amendments proposed on the floor for S. 744,204 thirteen concerned border security, 
and of those, seven concerned new trigger provisions. Of the six that did not concern border 
security triggers, four were overwhelmingly adopted by the Senate, such as Senator Dean 
Heller’s (R-NV) amendment to include Nevada on the Southern Border Security Commission or 
Senator Mark Pryor’s (D-AR) amendment to promote recruitment of veterans for the Border 
Patrol.205 Two of the four amendments that did not involve border security at all were agreed on 
by a voice vote. Meanwhile, all of the trigger amendments were controversial. In other words, 
the majority of controversial amendments proposed for the bill concerned border security 
triggers.  
 In short, the main site of statutory dispute in the debate involves the triggers that must be 
met prior to legalization. I explain in the next section how opponents of the bill envision 
subversive executive authority within these statutes. If the interpretive power behind these 
triggers lies with an agent, then the debate rests on what potential acts the legislature perceives 
from that agent. 
 
4.3 Opponents’ Interpretive Fear: Executive Subversion of Border Security Triggers 
Opponents contend that the bill’s trigger provisions do not compel the executive to follow 
through on border security. They push beyond the language of the bill to focus on the 
interpretive authority of the executive branch. They construct the motives of the executive 
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branch as subversive to congressional intent to increase border security provisions. Thus, 
opponents find ambiguity in the probable executive acts behind the legislative act.  
 The scenic constructions from the last chapter made Congress out to be impotent in the 
face of broken promises. Because promises were construed as acts without agents, the line of 
broken promises becomes a scene of acts in search of an agent. Once opponents turn their 
attention from policy history to the modern debate, this understanding of scene allows them to 
turn the debate over the legislation into a debate over Secretary Napolitano’s motives. Although 
the Secretary obviously cannot be held responsible for decades of bad immigration policy, the 
broken promises (acts) have finally found an agent. They construct the Secretary as a subversive 
agent that will not follow through on border security if given the power to interpret the triggers. 
Senator Sessions says that she “already said we have better enforcement than ever before in 
history and indicated she does not believe we need more fencing. The contention from the Gang 
of 8 that we are going to have major fencing at the border has not been proven.”206  Then 
Minority Leader Mitch McConnell (R-KY) claims that the bill merely offers “an assurance [from 
the Secretary] that the border is secure.”207 Lee insists that the bill provides for no congressional 
oversight of border security and that it would grant “broad discretion to the Secretary of 
Homeland Security to create the rules and regulations that will determine how the bill is to be 
implemented as well as authorize the Secretary in hundreds and hundreds of instances to simply 
ignore the law as it is enacted by Congress.”208 Grassley points to Secretary Napolitano’s role in 
implementing a border security strategy noting that she “believes the border is stronger than ever 
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before” and “does not believe a biometric exit system is feasible,” and he expresses concern that 
the Secretary can “take action contrary to what is claimed by the authors and, hence, can 
undercut the intentions of the authors.”209 The opposition constructs the Secretary’s motives in 
order to further build the case that too much interpretive authority would be abused by the 
executive branch. 
 This history of congressional impotence and construction of executive subversion lead 
opponents to the conclusion that Congress cannot give an inch of leeway on legalization prior to 
confirmation that the border is secure. Registered provisional immigrant (RPI) status for 
immigrants is such an inch. RPI status is a form of probation prior to permanent legalization 
measures years down the line. Thus, illegal immigrants can “come out of the shadows” for six 
years while the Department of Homeland Security works to secure the border.210 While extensive 
triggers exist to transition from RPI to a green card, the bill only requires the Secretary to meet 
two conditions before she begins granting RPI status to illegal immigrants. First, she has to 
submit a Southern Border Fencing Strategy, and second, she has to give Congress a notice that 
the department has begun implementing the strategy.211  
 In fact, opponents often make no distinctions between RPI status and legalization. 
Grassley insists that “RPI status is more than probation. RPI status is outright legalization.”212 
Thune contends that his amendment requiring “350 miles of fence to be completed prior to RPI 
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status being granted…would have meant border security first, then legalization.”213 Thune thus 
interchanges the words “RPI status” and “legalization,” making it RPI status the equivalent of 
border security after legalization. Senator Richard Shelby (R-AL) outlines the triggers prior to 
RPI status and contends that “no later than 6 months after this bill becomes law, those who came 
here illegally will be allowed to stay legally. I will clarify that further: That is amnesty.”214 The 
conflation of RPI status with “outright legalization” and amnesty makes sense if opponents see 
no real teeth in forcing those with RPI status to ever leave. Sessions reads into the bill a 
completely different executive act: 
So now 6 years later, they work intermittently, they are unemployed, and we have a 
recession, and we do not have enough jobs for people, and we are going to send out the feds 
and uproot them—their children are now in junior high and high school—and send them 
back home? Give me a break. That is one of the most bogus claims ever. That will not be 
enforced. There are waiver authorities in the bill, so waivers will be issued.215 
 
For Sessions, RPI status becomes a foothold, a six-year entrenchment of illegal immigrants into 
American society where it becomes unthinkable to deport them, thus robbing the bill of its 
enforcement provisions. As Grassley puts it, “we all know it will never be taken away.”216 When 
RPI status becomes legalization, it makes no difference whether there are tough triggers between 
RPI and green cards. RPI is already amnesty. 
 In short, the ambiguity in the policy lottery permits opponents to translate potential 
subversive executive acts within the legislative act before the Senate. Opponents draw on past 
enforcement failures and current executive motives to argue that the policy lottery leans towards 
amnesty through RPI status without border security ever being implemented. Through 
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amendments, they propose to put border security triggers prior to RPI status, and, as I will show 
in the next section, these amendments spur the fears of proponents that the policy lottery will 
prevent any legalization. 
 
4.4 Proponents’ Interpretive Fear: Congressional Subversion of Legalization Triggers 
Although opponents’ fears of losing interpretive authority are more prevalent in the debate, 
proponents of the bill also worry about the potential for the Congress or other actors to 
undermine its legalization provisions. Leahy calls Republican proposals for new triggers 
“unrealistic,” sees “efforts to modify the triggers in ways that could unduly delay or prevent the 
earned legalization path,” and even accuses the authors of the triggers of “pretending” to give a 
pathway to citizenship.217 Senator Sheldon Whitehouse (D-RI) regards new border triggers as 
“impossible” and calls them a “cynical attempt to deny a pathway to legalization.”218 Essentially, 
proponents read into new amendments the interpretive authority to permanently veto either the 
transition from illegal immigrant to RPI or from RPI to permanent status. Their main concerns 
arise with the amendments proposed by Cornyn, Grassley, and Paul.  
 Both Cornyn’s and Grassley’s amendments are based on the identical metrics of 
“operational control” and “effective control.” Cornyn would have required that the Secretary 
maintain “operational control” of the border prior to adjusting immigrants from provisional 
status to green cards, and he defines “operational control” in the amendment to mean that “within 
each and every sector of the Southern border, a condition exists in which there is an effectiveness 
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rate, informed by situational awareness, of not lower than 90 percent.” 219 Grassley’s “effective 
control” matches the definition of the existing bill and requires the same metrics as Cornyn’s 
“operational control,” except he would have the trigger precede RPI status.220 Both amendments 
conflict with the bill which does not make “effective control” a trigger for initial changes in 
immigrant status.221 Instead, the bill says “effective control” must be certified by the Secretary of 
Homeland Security prior to moving those with RPI status to green card status.222 
 Proponents take issue with the ambiguity and intangibility of an “effective control” 
metric to serve as a trigger because its interpretation can be located in subversive agents. Senator 
Schumer opposes the Cornyn amendment because the triggers “are not specific and 
achievable.”223 He instead insists on triggers that can be “measured,” or, in other words, triggers 
that concede no interpretive authority, such as miles of fencing or numbers of drones.224 Corker 
calls it a trigger that can be “monkeyed with.”225 He gives the example of a border agent making 
subjective decisions that affect measures of border security: “what happens down on the border 
right now is the Border Patrol agent sees a Cheetos bag, literally, and has to decide whether 10 
people ate out of that Cheetos bag and left it there or 1.”226 The uncertainty over the 
apprehension rate measure provides an interpretive angle unfavorable to legalization. Members 
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of Congress or even border control agents could exploit the uncertainty to argue that the border is 
not 90 percent secure. At the very least they could engage in what Marcus Paroske calls an 
“epistemological filibuster” where the uncertainty indefinitely precludes Congress from 
verifying that the border has reached “effective control.”227 Again, senators confront the issue of 
ambiguity—the issue of who gets to resolve statutory ambiguity and to which provisions the 
ambiguity potentially diminishes. By attempting to create tangible border security goals, 
proponents want to turn action into sheer motion and remove agent from the equation. 
 In addition to Grassley and Cornyn’s amendments, Paul’s “Trust, but Verify” amendment 
significantly shifts the interpretive authority of a secure border to the Congress. The following 
identical provisions are detailed under “Year 1” through “Year 5”: “Except as provide in section 
1_6, section 245B of the Immigration and Nationality Act, as added by section 2101 of this Act, 
shall cease to have effect beginning on December 31, 2014, unless Congress enacts a joint 
resolution pursuant to section 1_4 during the 1-year period ending on such date.”228 Section 1_4 
details a joint resolution that Congress would have to pass each year confirming that the border 
fencing, illegal immigrant incarceration, entry/exit, and all other border security provisions are 
on track for completion.229 Additionally, the amendment stipulates that the effectiveness rate of 
apprehensions must be at 95 percent.230 Without the resolution each year, the provisions for 
legalization would be rescinded. 
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 Paul’s amendment completely redefines the legislative act before the Senate. Because it 
requires that Congress vote separately to begin legalization, it turns the current bill into only a 
measure to crack down on illegal immigration. By definition, Paul wants to separate the two 
pieces—security and legalization—into two separate bills. Senators then would be forced to vote 
not once but five times for a legalization provision that is unpopular with the conservative base. 
Although he does not directly mention Paul’s amendment, Reid expresses concern that the 
Senate might repeat what happened in 2006 where the Congress only passed a border fencing bill 
without addressing legalization, thus creating a “backdoor way to undermine the legislation.”231 
Paul’s amendment fits with Schumer’s concern that opponents are trying to give themselves 
leeway to block the path to citizenship or Leahy’s concern that the path to citizenship will be 
“rigged by some elusive precondition.”232 For a Congress that seems out of power, that is just 
observing a scene of failure, it makes sense to insert Congress as an active agent of 
interpretation. However, to proponents who believe Congress has been active in implementing 
“enforcement first,” Congress does not need more power. In fact, as part of the old equation, 
Congress is potentially part of the problem because it has refused to pass legalization measures 
over the past decade. As with border patrol agents, proponents are eager to turn the triggers into 
sheer motion by not allowing subversive agents to act as a trigger, in this case, by voting to 
certify that the border is secure. 
 Overall, proponents’ concerns center on granting opponents interpretive leeway to block 
the legalization. Whether through the ambiguous “effective control” or a required congressional 
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verification, the amendments posed by the opposition would have swung the probabilities of the 
policy lottery the other direction towards security and away from a path to citizenship.  
 
4.5 Conclusion 
Ambiguity in legislative statutes often boils down to the interpretive authority inherently present 
in the policy lottery. The contest over a provision is not a contest over what the legislature 
intends but over the possible ways the language could give agency to subversive agents, over 
how much “play in the joints” the legislation gives to bad interpretations. In many cases, the 
potential subversive agents come from the executive branch, but they can also be members of 
Congress or people as unlikely as border security agents. Therefore, legislative ambiguity at least 
partially comes from attempts to reconstruct the motives of these interpretive authorities. 
 Rhetoricians have seen this kind of textual ambiguity before. Statutory constructions can 
easily become what Edward Sapir calls “condensation symbols,” symbols condense multiple 
meanings under one banner where normally said meanings would diverge from each other.233 
Both David Zarefsky and Leah Ceccarelli explain that rhetors can use this sort of strategic 
ambiguity to increase the popularity of a proposal.234 If multiple groups comprise the audience, 
then the strategic ambiguity allows the text to be amorphous enough to appeal to all the 
groups.235 Denise Bostdorff recognizes this sort of strategic hedging in Nixon’s policy rhetoric. 
Nixon announced his position on arms buildup in a way that left his position ultimately unclear 
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and thus potentially favorable to a larger audience.236 In the case of legislation, J. Michael Hogan 
and Leroy Dorsey note in the debate over the nuclear freeze that for politicians “the ambiguity of 
the [freeze] resolution proved its greatest virtue.”237 They point out that members of Congress 
were able to take the confusion surrounding the freeze resolution and tell the public that it did 
different things. Freeze advocates can claim victory, as can freeze opponents.238 Given what 
Robert Asen identifies as the “multiple authorship” factor of policy texts, it is difficult to ascribe 
strategic intent to any given ambiguous statute.239 However, the ambiguity does permit multiple 
constructions of the legislative act. With antagonistic translators, the ambiguity of a law can be 
used to draw out the worst interpretation possible and thus be used to make the law unpopular 
and snatch defeat from the jaws of victory.  
  
                                                 
236
 Bostdorff, 34. 
 
 
237
 Hogan and Dorsey, 331. 
 
 
238
 Ibid, 332. 
 
 
239
 Asen, “Reflections,” 132–133.  
80 
 
5 Conclusion 
Legislation is not neutral ground. The rhetoric and public policy literature has allowed it 
to function as a social fact, an almost epistemological necessity in order to investigate the 
normative force of other policy constructions. Yet, David Zarefsky’s contention about the force 
of rhetoric in public policy remains true, that “the facts of an episode in political life are not 
‘given’ or univocal; they are not present in the external world awaiting discovery by political 
actors. . . . The meaning of these events depends on how they are characterized in public 
discourse.”240 This is another fact we have to question—legislation is comprised of discourse and 
by its very nature allows for ambiguity and reinterpretation. It is not, however, discourse 
understood in-and-of-itself. There necessarily exists a legislation-behind-the-legislation, a 
constructed context which implicates the interpretation of statutes. Thus, senators in the 
immigration debate contest the meaning of the 2013 immigration bill by leveraging both the 
ambiguity of its context and the ambiguity of its statutes.  
In chapter three, I looked at the legislation-behind-the-legislation to understand how both 
sides mobilize and reconstruct recent immigration policy. Opponents redefined the modern 
history of immigration reform to one of faulty promises to secure the border, thus positioning S. 
744 as another bill in the line of promises. Proponents, meanwhile, constructed a history of 
“enforcement first” that put Congress as the active agent increasing border security over the last 
ten years. The 2013 bill for proponents thus was not a faulty promise but a guarantee of border 
security.  
In chapter four, I showed how the separate policy histories and the separate attributions 
of motives informed statutory interpretations of the bill. Both sides use contextual ambiguity to 
construct probable future acts allowed under the legislation, and statutory disputes involved 
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battles for interpretive authority. Opponents read into the statutes the potential for executive 
subversion of the border security provisions, so they attempted to pass amendments to give 
interpretive authority of statutes to Congress. Meanwhile, proponents constructed Congress as 
the likely subversive agent to undermine the legalization provisions. Therefore, proponents 
attempted to minimize subversion of the immigration legislation by constructing statutes that 
took interpretive authority away from Congress.  
In order to appreciate how policies are decided and disputed, we must understand all the 
sites of rhetorical intervention in legislative debates. Both contextual and statutory ambiguities 
are inherent to the legislative process and suggest that ambiguity potentially exists in every bill 
that comes through Congress. Scholars of rhetoric and public policy should recognize these 
ambiguities inside and outside of statutes in order to fully appreciate the opportunities for 
rhetorical construction in policy debates. 
My analysis also demonstrates the fruitfulness of bringing a legal perspective to bear on 
what we normally consider political issues. Legislation is law, and Congress deals with statutes 
as much as the courts. While this may seem obvious, the rhetoric and public policy literature 
rarely looks at Congress as a legal entity. Indeed, even those writing on legal rhetoric have 
neglected Congress in favor of the courts. We have created an artificial divide between political 
and legal rhetoric that should be questioned given the many intersections.  
In this conclusion, I draw out three major implications that come from looking at 
Congress through a rhetoric and law perspective. First, my analysis draws attention to the need 
for more studies that put the branches of the federal government into conversation with one 
another. Second, the legal work that permeates each branch draws our attention to Congress as a 
82 
 
technical legal sphere. Finally, the public may be relying on epistemological shortcuts to access 
the technical sphere of Congress.  
 
5.1 Recognizing the Undercurrent of Law in the Three Branches 
The law is an undercurrent flowing through each branch of government. We need to resist the 
urge to think of the presidency and Congress as political and court as legal. They are all both 
political and legal institutions. Congress makes the laws which are enacted by the executive and 
adjudicated by the judiciary, thus the law connects them all together. 
 My study demonstrates the advantages to taking a legal perspective on congressional 
rhetoric, a perspective without which it would be difficult to understand the polysemy in 
legislative acts. However, the Congress is not merely another case of rhetoric of law. The courts 
and Congress are different in their responsibilities with regards to the law, and in the Bitzerian 
sense, they face completely different exigencies.241 For example, I noted in chapter three that 
while it is incumbent upon judges to show they are consistent with past law the opposite impetus 
exists for Congress. Congress, in the face of failed policy, must show its inconsistency with the 
past that it is trying something new. The presumption is that the legislature will change the law, 
while the judiciary supposedly keeping the law constant. Legal precedents take a whole new 
meaning in congressional rhetoric. 
 Because the law flows through each branch, I see an opportunity for more comparative 
studies between the different branches. Comparative studies between the institutions of 
Congress, the Supreme Court, and the presidency are few and far between. Perhaps the most 
complete comparative study came from Craig Allen Smith and Kathy B. Smith over twenty years 
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ago.242 They invite us to look at each branch with an institutional perspective. Such a perspective 
allows rhetorical critics to focus on recurrent constraints and opportunities within the context of 
the institution.  
 Smith and Smith deal with the institutions discretely in their work, but we can also put 
them directly into conversation with one another. This project could involve starting in one of the 
institutions and looking outward at the others. Consider that the literature on the rhetorical 
presidency focuses on the president’s attempts to sway another branch of the federal government. 
By “going public,” the president uses the bully pulpit to push for his legislative proposals to be 
accepted by Congress.243 Thus, while the rhetorical presidency deals mostly with the institution 
of the presidency, the whole literature is still premised on interaction between the branches of the 
federal government, an aspect of presidential rhetoric recognized by the National Task Force on 
Presidential Communication to Congress in Martin Medhurst’s The Prospect of Presidential 
Rhetoric.244 In addition to going public, they identify four arenas of “direct communication” 
between the president and Congress: nominations and appointments, vetoes, major policy 
speeches (such as the State of the Union), and war and impeachment speeches.245 They suggest 
we can study these sites of exchange to better understand the power struggles between the 
president and Congress. From a congressional standpoint, Trevor Parry-Giles shows that we can 
look at the Supreme Court through the lens of Congress. He examines Supreme Court 
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confirmation hearings as sites where the public debates “the character of justice,” and certainly 
the president is implied in such an exchange because he nominates candidates for the court.246 In 
an underappreciated article, Goodnight and Olson invite readers to look at foreign policy as a 
rhetorical power struggle between the legislative and executive branches, and they further 
suggest understanding policy as it engages all three branches in larger debates.247  
 We do not have to look to explicit moments of engagement between the branches. I have 
shown in the immigration debate that senators engage with the executive branch. Specifically, 
senators anticipate potential acts of the executive under the statutes enacted by Congress. They 
recognize that Congress does not have full control over the law and work to maximize that 
control by robbing the executive of interpretive authority. Even though I start in Congress, I am 
forced to look to potential executive acts to understand how the law is being written and 
interpreted by members of Congress. I have shown that this joint governance under the law can 
confuse where responsibility ultimately lies for policy. By scapegoating the different interpretive 
agents as subversive, Congress has pathologized public deliberation. Law necessitates 
interpretation by some agent, whether that agent is the executive or legislature. Deliberation 
cannot function when all potential interpretations of a law become reasons to reject it. 
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5.2 Rethinking Congress as a Technical Legal Sphere 
By recognizing the law flows through each branch of government, we also have to recognize that 
congressional debates largely reside not in the “public sphere” but in what scholars call the 
“technical sphere,” in a community built on expertise. We must partially realize this with 
growing interest in the institutional rhetoric of Congress.248 More simply, we can recognize 
Congress as Habermas does—as a “legal community.”249 Most members of the Senate are former 
lawyers that are actively engaged in writing the law. Congress is a technical sphere and requires 
legal language in order to do its job. Should the public care to engage in statutory interpretation, 
it would have a difficult time reading legislation. The public’s lack of direct access to the 
legislative act problematizes Congress’s accountability to the public and raises issues regarding 
how ambiguity is mobilized in debating legislation.  
The United States democratic system risks being overtaken by a technocracy whenever it 
engages with complex policy issues. This process is what Goodnight calls the degradation of the 
public sphere of deliberation.250 The more Congress passes laws related technical issues such as 
ozone depletion, nuclear power, and computer hacking, the more it puts the public at the mercy 
of the technical sphere.251 The public may ultimately be forced to sit on the sidelines while 
important policy issues are decided by experts. Although Dale Brashers and Sally Jackson have 
tried to give the public a way to penetrate the technical sphere, their research on ACT UP does 
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not offer a way for the public to challenge experts’ claims of fact.252 Rather, Brashers and 
Jackson point to public challenges regarding methods and objectives.253 The public may still take 
a back seat because, as Charles Willard argues, “our epistemic environment is so constituted that 
deference to authority…is the rational thing to do.”254 Certainly, some levels of technical 
discourse can be penetrated by the lay public, but the technical sphere still grounds the public in 
the epistemic environment. Experts may not decide what the public should do or how it should 
do it, but they do decide what the public knows. In the case of legislation, they interpret what the 
public knows about the proposed policy and what the statutes require.   
Equally troubling is the prospect of the public overriding experts on issues too 
complicated for the layperson to understand. The public’s entrance into the technical sphere can 
be inherently problematic because the public’s standards for evaluating technical arguments can 
produce irrational results. Even John Dewey, an advocate for public participation in 
policymaking, admits that in the face of technical issues “the public and its organization for 
political ends is not only a ghost, but a ghost which walks and talks, and obscures, confuses and 
misleads governmental action in a disastrous way.”255 In other words, the public does not know 
what it is talking about but comes to decisions on technical issues, which amounts to what 
Nicholas Paliewicz calls “the public usurpation of the technical sphere.”256 Indeed, this public 
usurpation is on full display in Leah Ceccarelli’s work. She explains how rhetors seeking to 
                                                 
252
 Dale E. Brashers and Sally Jackson, “‘Politically-Savvy Sick People’: Public Penetration of the 
Technical Sphere,” Argument in Controversy: Proceedings of the Seventh SCA/AFA Conference on Argumentation, 
ed. Donn W. Parson (Annandale, VA: Speech Communication Association, 1991), 284. 
 
253
 Ibid. 
 
254
 Charles Arthur Willard, “Cassandra’s Heirs,” Argument and Social Practice: Proceedings of the Fourth 
SCA/AFA Conference on Argumentation (Annandale, VA: Speech Communication Association, 1985), 29. 
 
 
255
 John Dewey, The Public and Its Problems (Athens, OH: Ohio State University Press, 1927), 124-125. 
 
256
 Paliewicz, 232. 
87 
 
subvert policies will “manufacture” scientific controversies by asserting that scientists disagree 
about an issue for which there actually exists a large scientific consensus.257 In the case of AIDS, 
intelligent design, and climate change, the public is confused by media spin doctors, and 
disastrous policies emerge from this confusion.258 Noting Ceccarelli’s work, Goodnight himself 
acknowledges that the tide has turned and now “it may be the case that technical knowledge 
itself needs to find productive entry into public communication, given its status has been 
diminished and its findings attacked….”259 Overall, it seems the public has trouble assimilating 
technical evidence into policy debates.  
Ultimately, the public’s best attempts to evaluate scientific claims rely on indirect, 
secondhand evidence. In the debate over intelligent design (ID), for example, ID advocates insist 
that schools should “teach the controversy” between evolution and creationism, a clear appeal to 
the societal value of fairness.260 Once ID is taught alongside evolution, it appears that both are 
equal positions with equal evidence.261 The uncertainty is proven not by a direct evaluation of the 
evidence but by indirect evidence, by an appearance of disagreement. Paliewicz eventually 
makes a Faustian bargain by suggesting we use indirect methods of evaluation for technical 
issues, such as evidence for the motives of scientists. 262 The public may have no other means of 
getting at the evidence. However, these are still secondhand ways of knowing, and, as Ceccarelli 
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shows, these indirect evaluative methods can be manipulated, leading the public into poorly 
grounded decisions.  
 
5.3 Taking Stock of Epistemological Shortcuts to Legislative Meaning 
As a technical document, legislation suffers the same problem of access as scientific findings. 
The contextualizing legislation-behind-the-legislation may be the only means for the public to 
understand the legislative act, and we should be attuned to the ways that the legislation-behind-
the-legislation can be used to manipulate our understanding of legislation. Taking Burke’s 
pentad again, I can imagine many ways that our assumptions about democratic deliberation can 
be leveraged to provide the public with epistemological shortcuts to “knowing” the legislation. 
Deliberative democracy scholarship already provides many cues how we get at our product—
policy—without actually getting at the thing itself.  
Many deliberation and argumentation theorists embody the logic of the agency-act ratio. 
When they argue that new methods and procedures will save our democratic system, they sign 
onto a powerful means-oriented philosophy.263 Dewey, for instance, locates the problem of the 
public in the complexity of the administration of the state.264 In order to avoid a technocracy, he 
proposes that we improve education so public citizens can have the agency to judge expert 
findings without necessarily becoming experts themselves.265 Acolytes of “strategic 
maneuvering” also put their faith in discussion procedures to guide interlocutors away from 
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fallacious arguments, and to the extent that Congress is highly procedural, expectations of good 
procedure can be used to leverage our means-ends understanding.266  
I have shown in this project how the scene can be constructed in ways that reinterpret 
legislation as congruent with policy history, and some in deliberation scholarship also put faith in 
the power of the scene. In his account of the transformation of the public sphere, Jürgen 
Habermas locates the rise of a critical public sphere in the socio-economic conditions of the 
Enlightenment with the rising economic and political power of the bourgeois class, locating the 
motivating force of an ideal public (and presumably ideal laws) largely in scenic conditions.267 
This explains why his recommendation for an ideal society relies on widening the public sphere, 
a scenic term, by making the activities of institutions and corporations more public.268 Goodnight 
similarly claims that the public sphere is being “eroded,” except in this case by the technical 
sphere. 269 He and Habermas both fear that publicity is threatened. In other words, until the scene 
is altered, the public cannot reclaim critical deliberation. In a policy era with politicians running 
against the government, the government itself could be the scenic condition that does not permit 
the true public to voice its concerns, thus any legislation out of a poisoned government scene 
may reconstruct the legislative act negatively. 
In pining for the conditions of the Enlightenment, Habermas incurred a famous critique 
from Nancy Fraser. Fraser took issue with the exclusionary practices of public sphere 
deliberation, the fact that Habermas’s public sphere was still decidedly a “bourgeoisie” public 
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sphere.270 She argues instead that the good state requires an inclusive view of both publics and 
“counterpublics.”271 Thus, Fraser introduces a third point of stasis into the equation—agents. The 
good state must be comprised of the right agents; otherwise, the state will produce unjust 
policy.272 Certainly to the extent that legislation reflects its authors can senators renegotiate our 
understanding of a bill by pointing to the nefarious cabal of interests propagating it, such as big 
business or labor unions. 
Meanwhile, political scientists shift the motivational focus to purpose, arguing that the 
most prevalent explanation of policy is future campaign prospects. Richard Fenno notably calls 
reelection the primary motivation of members of Congress—a claim that has been consistently 
repeated by political scientists.273 Any reorientation of our political system, thus, has to deal with 
the centrality of the “permanent campaign” and the potential malign purposes of any legislative 
initiatives.274 Thus, campaign season itself becomes a reason to reject legislation. It almost 
becomes a scene of malign purposes—every politician is trying to win reelection, so they cannot 
be trusted to have the proper purpose of good policy.  
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My point here is not that Burke’s pentad merely fits with these theories. I agree with 
David Zarefsky that it is not fruitful to attempt to prove nonfalsifiable theories.275 My purpose 
instead has been to show the importance of these motivational assumptions and how they can be 
leveraged to reinterpret legislation. Ceccarelli has shown us that balancing norms and democratic 
values can be “exploited” by those who wish to subvert policy.276 As critics, we should be attune 
to moments in legislative debates when assumptions about deliberative scenes, agents, purposes, 
and agencies are used as indirect ways to evaluate legislation or when they are manipulated to 
make legislation appear better or worse than it is. 
 With these three major implications in mind—the legal connection among the three 
branches, the Congress as a technical sphere, and the epistemological problems of knowing 
legislation—we should continue to expand the rhetoric and public policy literature by 
incorporating insights from legal scholars. In the words of Ronald Dworkin, “We are subjects of 
law’s empire, liegemen to its methods and ideals, bound in spirit while we debate what we must 
therefore do.”277 We must uncover the full function of rhetoric in the empire and understand 
what it means to be law’s citizens. 
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